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NOTES
SHATTERING THE MYTH: MEDIATING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT DISPUTES IN THE WORKPLACE
Carrie A. Bond*
"The great enemy of truth is very often not the lie-deliberate, con-
trived, and dishonest-but the myth-persistent, persuasive and real-
istic Too often we hold fast to the cliches of our forebears.",
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment has infected the American workplace. Studies
put the incidence of sexual harassment at fifty percent to eighty per-
cent of all working women,2 with five percent of men and fifteen per-
cent of women suffering sexual harassment each year. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the government
agency responsible for ensuring equal employment in the workplace,4
* I would like to thank my husband for his continued love and support in every
way, and my parents for their encouragement and the example they have set as par-
ents, people, and workplace managers. I would also like to thank Professors George
Friedman and Nolan-Haley for their guidance with this Note.
1. John F. Kennedy, Commencement Speech at Yale, in The Great Thoughts 226,
226 (George Seldes ed., 1985) (1962).
2. Susan R. Meredith, Using Fact Finders to Probe Workplace Claims of Sexual
Harassment, 47 Arb. 1. 61, 61 (1992). These are the more conservative figures; one of
the earliest mainstream sexual harassment surveys, a Redbook poll cited by Meredith,
shows that 90% of 9,000 women surveyed in 1976 reported being harassed at work.
Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Har-
assment, Redbook, Nov. 1976, at 149, 217.
3. Mary P. Rowe, People Who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint System with Both
Formal and Informal Options, 6 Negotiation J. 161, 162 (1990). Because in the major-
ity of cases the victim of sexual harassment is female, this Note will refer to the victim
as "she." This is not to discount the significant number of male victims of harassment
who seek legal relief. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., No. 96-5145,
1997 WL 73312, at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1997) (upholding male complainant's same-sex
sexual harassment claim); Schrader v. E.G. & G., Inc., No. CIV.A.95-B-870, 1997 WL
61018, at *9 (D. Colo. Feb. 7, 1997) (dismissing male plaintiff's claim for sexual har-
assment by female supervisor). This Note also uses the terms "victim" and "com-
plainant" interchangeably although a legal complaint has not necessarily been filed.
4. Reorganization Plan 1 of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (1994) (transferring authority
for agency determinations of sexual harassment from the Civil Service Commission to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). The EEOC ("EEOC") instructs
potential victims that "[c]harges of sexual harassment may be filed at any field office
of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." Facts About Sexual Har-
assmen4 in The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Technical
Assistance Program, Sex Discrimination B-4, B-4 (1995) [hereinafter Sex Discrimina-
tion]. The job of the EEOC is to receive complaints, investigate them, attempt concil-
iation, and litigate claims on the behalf of the victims. Edward J. Costello, Jr., The
Mediation Alternative in Sex Harassment Cases, 47 Arb. J. 16, 18 (1992). In practice,
the EEOC meets few of these goals, and "[tihe only thing all parties can be relatively
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has a backlog of over 80,000 sexual harassment cases.5 This is espe-
cially remarkable given that the percentage of sexual harassment
claims actually reported is traditionally very low. 6
Sexual harassment in the workplace has also been a frequent topic
in the news over the last few years, as evidenced by the extensive na-
tional coverage of both the Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas hearings7
and the sexual harassment allegations against Baker & McKenzie, one
of the country's largest law firms.8 Too often, employers consider
their dispute resolution policies, or lack thereof, after an incident of
sexual harassment, rather than designing policies as a preventative
measure. Neither arbitration nor civil litigation, both costly in time
and money, provide any solution to such a socially detrimental and
pervasive problem. Disputants should not resort to litigation and ar-
bitration simply because those are the methods that they have always
employed.
This Note provides a contractual provision that proposes mediation
as a method for resolving sexual harassment disputes. Mediation of-
fers a potential plaintiff all of the remedies available in litigation, in-
cluding cash settlements, in addition to other remedies that can be
specifically tailored to the individual plaintiff's situation. Part I dis-
cusses the serious problem of sexual harassment in the workplace.
Part II sets forth the two most common dispute resolution methods
for sexual harassment claims, litigation and arbitration, and explains
why both are ultimately ill-suited for resolving sexual harassment dis-
sure of at the EEOC level is that the complainant will have to wait six months before
doing anything else about the complaint." Id. The EEOC does pass guidelines, how-
ever, on how the federal regulations defining sexual harassment should be inter-
preted. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. These guidelines are frequently
relied on by the courts in their determinations of unlawful and harassing conduct. See,
e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
5. Nadya Aswad, ADR: Many Attorneys Welcome EEOC Decision to Refer
Charges to Federal Mediators, 200 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8 (Oct. 16, 1996). In
fact, as a result of the backlog, the EEOC has agreed, in conjunction with the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, to offer mediation for discrimination claims. Id.
6. Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Proce-
dures, in Sexual Harassment 197, 198 (Edmund Wall ed., 1992); Hearings on H.R. 1,
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. 168, 172 (1991) [hereinafter The Civil Rights Act of
1991: Hearings] (statement of Dr. Freada Klein) (indicating that more than 90% of
sexual harassment victims are unwilling to report the incidents).
7. See, e.g., Jill Abramson & David Shribman, High Court Drama: Sex Harass-
ment Furor Jeopardizes Thomas, Embarrasses Politicians, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1991, at
Al (discussing how Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment impacted Justice
Thomas' Supreme Court nomination); see also Anna D. Smith, The Most Riveting
Television: The Hill-Thomas Hearings and Popular Culture, in Race, Gender, and
Power in America 248, 248 (Anita F. Hill & Emma C. Jordan eds., 1995) ("The Hill-
Thomas hearings were one of the most watched public events in the history of
television.").
8. See, e.g., Sex-Harassment Award Reduced, N.Y. Tumes, Nov. 29, 1994, at A22
(discussing a California state judge's reduction of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages awarded to plaintiff Rena Weeks).
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putes. Part III provides an introduction to mediation and explains
why mediation is the preferable forum for resolving most sexual har-
assment disputes. Part IV offers a sample mediation provision appro-
priate for integration into an employment contract or handbook.
Finally, part V carefully parses the contractual agreement proposed in
part IV, offering justifications for each clause of the provision. This
Note stresses the central role that mediation should play in an em-
ployer's sexual harassment policy to minimize the effects of illegal
conduct on workers and the workplace.
I. THE REALITY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Any policy aimed at eradicating workplace sexual harassment must
first face the "formidable task" of defining sexual harassment. 9 Be-
cause the harassment occurs in the workplace, a highly social environ-
ment, a delineation must be made between illegal conduct and
ordinary social interaction.'" Once harassment is identified, Title VII,
the federal anti-discrimination statute,1 is the primary legal vehicle
through which an employee can seek relief.12 Yet sexual harassment
has only existed as a cause of action under Title VII for twenty
years.' 3 Nevertheless, these twenty years have produced a wealth of
9. Cynthia F. Cohen, Legal Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Cases, 38 Lab. LJ.
681, 681 (1987). Sexual harassment is itself "a term of art-a statutory concept that
derives from an interpretation of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination."
Tim Bornstein, Arbitration of Sexual Harassment, in Arbitrating Sexual Harassment
Cases 1-31, 1-32 (Vern E. Hauck ed., 1995). Sexual harassment is difficult to define
because it encompasses such a diverse range of behavior, from off-color jokes to
workplace rape. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings, supra note 6, at 185 (state-
ment of Dr. Freada Klein). Further, sexual harassment is both "subjective" and "con-
text-dependent." Id.
10. Cohen, supra note 9, at 681.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail to
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
Id
12. Title VII, however, is not the only course of action for an injured sexual har-
assment plaintiff. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
13. Sexual harassment was first held to be actionable under Title VII in Williams
v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), revd, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (re-
versing summary judgment for the employee for a trial de novo). The Supreme Court
subsequently agreed with the Williams court, finding a cause of action for sexual har-
assment under Title VII in Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Cathe-
rine MacKinnon, well known for her book entitled Sexual Harassment of Working
Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979), was instrumental in Congress's recog-
nition of sexual harassment as a Title VII claim. See Deborah N. McFarland, Note,
Beyond Sex Discrimination: A Proposal for Federal Sexual Harassment Legislation,
65 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 510 (1996) (discussing MacKinnon's role in shaping sexual
harassment law).
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conflicting case law as courts struggle with the vexing task of identify-
ing and remedying sexual harassment.
A distillation of the case law is necessary so that both employers
and employees will be able to discern what conduct is illegal under
Title VII. After an alleged act of harassment, an understanding of
sexual harassment law is imperative for the parties involved in a sex-
ual harassment dispute so that they can evaluate the viability of their
Title VII claim. This will both inform the parties and aid them in de-
ciding whether they are interested in litigating the case in court. This
part offers a general discussion of what constitutes Title VII sexual
harassment, identifies the costs of harassment to society, and in-
troduces the main actors in any sexual harassment dispute.
A. Sexual Harassment: What Is It?
Title VII sexual harassment is commonly defined as "unwelcome"
conduct or requests of a sexual nature.' 4 There are two strands of
sexual harassment actionable under Title VII: quid pro quo15 and
hostile environment. 16
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a harasser makes employ-
ment or employment benefits contingent upon submission to sexual
requests. 17 This type of harassment is both more established and
more clearly defined than the hostile environment strand.'8 To prove
quid pro quo sexual harassment at trial, a plaintiff must establish:
1) that the employee was a member of a protected class; 2) that the
employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
15. See, e.g, Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62 (stating that a quid pro quo claim exists where
the harassment "involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual
favors"); see also Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.) (recognizing
a claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment where the plaintiff claimed that her super-
visor "coerced her into a violent sexual relationship by telling her that she 'owed him'
for all he was doing for her" and that "the conditions of her employment-including
her raises, hours, autonomy and flexibility-varied from time to time, depending on
her responsiveness to [her supervisor]"), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213 (1994).
16. The first federal court to uphold a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim was the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1981. Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court later recognized this claim as actiona-
ble under Title VII in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
17. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62; Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778.
18. Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993).
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form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; 3) that the
harassment complained of was based on sex; 4) that the employee's
submission to the unwelcomed advances was an express or implied
condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee's refusal to
submit to the supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible lob
detriment; and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. 9
The hostile environment strand shares many common burdens of
proof with the quid pro quo strand.2" A hostile work environment
constitutes sexual harassment when the complainant shows that:
1) she belongs to a protected group; 2) she was subject to unwel-
come sexual harassment; 3) the harassment was based on sex; 4) the
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment;
and 5) [the employer] knew or should have known of the harass-
ment and failed to take proper remedial action. 1
The line dividing quid pro quo harassment from hostile environment
harassment is difficult to discern, as the two strands often occur to-
gether.' Complaints under the hostile environment strand, however,
are more common. 
3
B. Shared Elements of Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment Claims
Establishing sexual harassment under either the quid pro quo or
hostile environment strand places many of the same burdens of proof
on the plaintiff. This section discusses those common elements, in-
cluding the requirements of proving the plaintiff's membership in a
protected class, the unwelcomeness of the activity, that the discrimina-
tion was based on sex, and employer liability.
1. Protected Class
Both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment
claimants may be required to establish that they belong to a protected
19. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992); see also 1 Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace: Law and Practice § 6.43, at 279-84 (2d ed. 1994).
20. Compare supra text accompanying note 19 (listing proof burdens on the quid
pro quo plaintiff) with infra text accompanying note 21 (listing proof burdens on the
hostile environment plaintiff).
21. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993); see
also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (finding claim for hostile environment sexual harassment);
Conte, supra note 19, § 6.44, at 284-304.
22. EEOC Notice March 3, 1990 Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual
Harassmen4 in Sex Discrimination, supra note 4, at D-1, D-3; see, eg., Carrero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff had
established both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment).
23. Mori Irvine, Note, Mediation: Is It Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Griev-
ances?, 9 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 27, 40 (1993).
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group.24 Not all courts, however, include this prong in their formula-
tions of the legal standard- 5 Even in jurisdictions that require proof
of this element, the burden is essentially nonexistent. Because an em-
ployer could discriminate against any given employee, every employee
is a member of the protected class, broadly defined as "workers. ' 6
2. Unwelcomeness of the Alleged Harasser's Conduct
Both strands of sexual harassment also require proof that the sexual
harassment was, as a legal matter, unwelcome.27 Courts agree that the
behavior must be objectively, and therefore reasonably, unwelcome.2 8
Requiring a reasonableness threshold releases employers from liabil-
ity for claims where a plaintiff is "hypersensitive. 12 9 At this juncture,
however, courts split between requiring that a plaintiff establish that
the conduct would offend a "reasonable person,' 30 and requiring
proof that a "reasonable woman" would be offended.3 1
Defenders of the reasonable woman standard argue that, in the con-
text of sexual harassment, the reasonable person standard ignores the
very real differences between what men and women find offensive in
the workplace.32 Because men have historically been over-repre-
24. Compare supra text accompanying note 19 (requiring proof that quid pro quo
plaintiff was in a "protected class") with supra text accompanying note 21 (requiring
proof that hostile environment plaintiff was in a "protected group").
25. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (explicating a
three-prong hostile environment sexual harassment claim and not requiring proof that
the victim was a member of a protected class); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (providing the elements of a hostile environment claim, and
not requiring proof that victim was a member of a protected class).
26. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (requiring "a
simple stipulation that the employee is a man or woman"); Radtke v. Everett, 501
N.W.2d 155, 162 (Mich. 1993) (stating that the plaintiff must establish that she "be-
longed to a protected group").
27. Compare supra note 19 (requiring "unwelcome sexual harassment") with
supra note 21 (same).
28. See, e.g., Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 164 (applying a "reasonable person" stan-
dard); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (applying a "reasonable woman" standard).
29. Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 458 (N.J. 1993). While these
courts used an objective standard to determine whether the conduct was unwelcome,
they did not ignore the victims' subjective experiences. Courts utilize this information
in evaluating the damages in the harassment claim. "[T]he subjective reaction of the
plaintiff and her individual injuries [is] relevant to compensatory damages." Id.
30. See, e.g., Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 167 (applying a "reasonable person"
standard).
31. See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 ("[W]e believe that a sex-blind reasonable
person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the exper-
iences of women."). Of course, if the plaintiff were male, the standard would be that
of a reasonable man; the vantage point is that of "a reasonable victim of the same sex
as the plaintiff." Id. at 880; see also Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 458 ("If the plaintiff is male,
the perspective used shall be that of a reasonable man.").
32. Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 459; see also Rosemarie Skaine, Power and Gender:
Issues in Sexual Dominance and Harassment 178 (1996) (citing numerous studies
finding a difference between how men and women perceive sexual harassment). "The
variable that most consistently predicts variation in people's definition of sexual har-
[Vol. 652494
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sented in positions of power in the workplace, their views are often
considered normative.33 Therefore, use of the reasonable person stan-
dard runs the risk of validating the majority male perspective of ac-
ceptable on-the-job behavior.'
Notably, courts opposing the reasonable woman standard also ex-
press concern about entrenching unfavorable gender stereotypes.
These courts are reluctant to endorse a gender-specific standard be-
cause it reflects a view that women are weak and need the protection
of a separate standard.3 5 Some scholars also take offense at the "es-
sentialist" nature of the reasonable woman standard because it treats
all women as if their response to sexual behavior is uniform and natu-
rally predetermined.36
Sexual harassment, therefore, is not defined by completely objec-
tive criteria; the key term is "unwelcome." To prove that conduct was
unwelcome, the victim must demonstrate that she did not solicit or
assment is the sex of the rater [evaluating the behavior]. Men label fewer behaviors
at work as sexual harassment." ld. While men and women can agree that certain
egregious conduct should be considered harassment, men view more subtle sexual
behavior directed toward them as flattering, while women view these same acts as
insulting. Id.
33. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1189 (1989) ("Men, who enjoy a hegemonic
power over social meanings by virtue of their dominant status in society, label as
'different' all qualities, values, and practices characteristic of or associated with
women.").
34. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878; Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 459.
35. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Mich. 1993).
The belief that women are entitled to a separate legal standard merely rein-
forces, and perhaps originates from, the stereotypic notion that first justified
subordinating women in the workplace. Courts utilizing the reasonable wo-
man standard pour into the standard stereotypic assumptions of women
which infer women are sensitive, fragile, and in need of a more protective
standard. Such paternalism degrades women ....
ld
36. Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Litera-
ture, 4 UCLA Women's LJ. 37,50 (1993); see also Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of
Legal Language." The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 1398 (1992) (critiquing the reasonable woman standard). Any reasona-
bleness standard is essentialist in the sense that the actions of a hypothetical person
are dubbed normative in the eyes of the law. To the extent that a reasonableness
standard insulates employers from oversensitive employees, it is desirable. See supra
note 29 and accompanying text. Beyond this point, however, courts should refrain
from further fracturing the standard. One scholar argues that a black woman, for
example, may have a different view of harassment than a white woman as a result of
her race. Abrams, supra note 33, at 1214. Socioeconomic position may also affect a
woman's perception of sexual harassment. Id. Applying a reasonable woman stan-
dard is a difficult task because it is defined in relation to a reasonable man standard,
which is itself amorphous. It is not desirable or efficient to implement standards that
are more plaintiff-specific. Otherwise innocuous behavior, for example, might be har-
assment if targeted at a Native American woman of limited economic means, but not
at a middle-class, white female employee. Assessing one's workplace conduct is chal-
lenging enough without muddying the waters by splintering the reasonable man or, if
necessary, reasonable woman standard even further.
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invite the behavior.37  The Supreme Court has said that the un-
welcomeness determination turns on credibility and is largely a ques-
tion for the trier of fact.38
3. Discrimination Based on Gender
The plaintiff must establish that, but for her gender, she would not
have been harassed.39 When the conduct is "sexual or sexist in nature,
the but-for element will automatically be satisfied."40 An actionable
claim, however, need not be clearly sexual.4' If, for example, a har-
asser targeted only women and subjected them to a particular physical
but not overtly sexual encounter, this would meet the but-for require-
ment.42 Because in crafting Title VII Congress intended to protect
against gender-specific discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that
she suffered harassment because she was a woman.43
Consequently, this but-for requirement has led courts to conclude
that a bisexual employee may harass others without fear of Title VII
liability.44 In this instance, a harasser would be according similar
treatment to both men and women. As such, instances of harassment
equally offensive to both genders do not support a sexual harassment
claim.45
37. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
38. Id. To refute a plaintiff's claim that the behavior was unwelcome, an employer
might allege that the victim participated in the incident voluntarily. Because a plain-
tiff may consent out of fear, however, this argument cannot constitute a complete
defense to allegations of sexual harassment. The focus is on whether the complainant
indicated the conduct was unwelcome, not whether she participated in it. Id.
39. Compare supra text accompanying note 19 (requiring that quid pro quo sexual
harassment be based on gender) with supra text accompanying note 21 (requiring that
hostile environment sexual harassment be based on gender). Interestingly, the wo-
man filing suit need not be the target of all, or even any, of the offensive conduct if it
created a hostile working environment for her. Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626
A.2d 445, 457 (N.J. 1993).
40. Id at 454.
41. Id.; Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Intimidation
and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously result from con-
duct other than explicit sexual advances.").
42. See Lehmann, 501 N.W.2d at 454.
43. Likewise, a male victim of harassment must establish that he was harassed
because he was a man.
44. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)
("[I]nstances of complained of conduct that prove equally offensive to male and fe-
male workers would not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge .... "), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982); see also Anja A. Chan, Women and Sexual Harassment: A Practical Guide to
the Legal Protections of Title VII and the Hostile Environment Claim 9-10 (1994);
Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 55, 79 (1995) ("[T]ruly bisexual harassment is not
disparate treatment prohibited by Title VII."). The question of whether bisexual har-
assment should fall under Title VII is beyond the scope of this Note. For an argument
suggesting that both bisexual and homosexual harassment should be actionable, see
McFarland, supra note 13, at 541-42.
45. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
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4. Employer Liability
The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex4 6 deline-
ate the level of employer liability appropriate where the harasser is a
supervisor, another employee, and even a non-employee outside
party.47 An employer is liable for harassment by an employee's super-
visor or an agent of the employer regardless of whether the employer
knew or should have known that the harassment was occurring.48 Su-
pervisors "trigger strict liability in the sense that they have been
cloaked with the employer's authority and act as its alter ego." 49
The same level of strict respondeat superior liability, however, does
not extend to cases where another non-supervisory employee or a
non-employee is the harasser. In those cases, an employer is liable for
harassment by another employee or a non-employee only if it knew or
should have known of the harassment. 50 Courts will review the level
of control that the employer had over the behavior of any non-em-
ployee to determine whether liability should be imputed to the em-
ployer.51 An employer can escape liability where either another non-
supervisory employee or non-employee harasses an employee if the
employer can show that it acted immediately to correct the situation.52
C. Unique Elements of the Quid Pro Quo and Hostile
Environment Claims
As demonstrated above, a quid pro quo plaintiff and a hostile envi-
ronment plaintiff share four burdens of proof, including establishing
that they are a member of a protected class, that the offensive conduct
was unwelcome, that they were targeted because of their gender, and
that their employer is liable for the harassment.53 At this point, how-
ever, the two strands diverge. Quid pro quo and hostile environment
harassment differ in their formulations of what conduct constitutes
harassment, and in what damages a plaintiff must prove to recover.
This section examines the unique elements of both the quid pro quo
and hostile environment sexual harassment strands.
46. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(e)
(1997) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines]. For an explication of the role of the EEOC
and its Guidelines in sexual harassment determinations, see supra note 4.
47. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(a)-(e).
48. Id. § 1604.11(c).
49. Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Employment Practices Manual: A
Guide to Minimizing Constitutional, Statutory and Common-Law Liability § 6:25 at
54 (1994).
50. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(d)-(e).
51. Id. § 1604.11(e).
52. Id. § 1604.11(d)-(e).
53. See supra part I.B.
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1. Quid Pro Quo Claims
The central issue commonly litigated in quid pro quo claims is
whether the harasser used the complainant's conduct as a basis for
determining any element of her employment. 4 It is sufficient for the
plaintiff to show that the harasser made job benefits contingent on her
acceptance or rejection of his advances. 5  Traditionally, the plaintiff
must also establish economic loss as a result of the harassment. 56
2. Hostile Environment Claims
To be actionable under the hostile environment strand, the harass-
ment must affect a term or condition of employment, and not all har-
assment meets this requirement.57 The Supreme Court has held that
the harassment must be so severe that it alters the plaintiff's employ-
ment, creating an abusive working environment.5 8 The damage
caused to the plaintiff, however, need not be both economic and psy-
chological for her to recover.59 For example, if the harassment de-
tracts from her job performance, or interferes with a promotion, it is
not necessary that the harassment also affect the plaintiff's psychologi-
cal well-being.6"
The EEOC has advised courts to examine the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" when deciding whether an environment is legally hos-
tile.6 The Supreme Court has delineated several factors that courts
should consider in evaluating harassment, including the frequency and
severity of the harassment, whether the behavior is of a threatening or
humiliating nature, and the extent to which the conduct interferes
54. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[To
establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment, a plaintiff must present evi-
dence that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct, and that her reaction to that
conduct was then used as the basis for decisions affecting the compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of her employment." (emphasis omitted)), cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1213 (1994).
55. Il The plaintiff from whom the supervisor requests sexual favors, however, is
not the only one who may sue. The EEOC Guidelines indicate that other employees
who were qualified for, but denied, a benefit because it was conferred on another
employee who was acquiescing to the harasser's requests may also sue the employer.
EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(g); see, e.g., King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878,
882 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding a basis for a discrimination claim where an employee
was passed over for promotion because of her supervisor's relationship with a fellow
employee). This employee has a cause of action under Title VII because the harass-
ment directly affects the passed-over employee's employment as well.
56. See Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989).
57. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
58. IdL
59. Ide at 64 ("[Tjhe language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'
discrimination.").
60. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
61. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(b).
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with the plaintiff's work performance.62 In most cases, a finding of
hostile environment is based upon "multiple and varied combinations
and frequencies of offensive exposures."6  If sufficiently severe, how-
ever, a single incident may create an abusive environment, especially
where the workplace is small and close-knit.' In fact, one court
found the basis for a hostile environment claim in two days of extreme
harassment.65 If sufficiently severe, even short-term harassment can
detrimentally affect the workplace. The next section explicates how
costly sexual harassment is to workers, employers, and society.
D. Costs of Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment, whether it is quid pro quo or hostile environ-
ment, carries innumerable costs to victims, employers, and society.
The law targets sexual harassment specifically because of the harm it
causes to society.' Although the victims are hurt psychologically,
physically, and financially, they are not the only casualties of sexual
harassment.67
Employers also suffer from the adverse effects of sexual harass-
ment. The employer sustains reduced efficiency and safety in the
workplace.' Further, the employer is hurt when employees leave
their jobs or incur medical and sick leave costs as a result of the un-
lawful harassment.69 In a presentation to the House of Representa-
62. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. In some jurisdictions, a woman may show that other
women have been harassed to demonstrate the severity of her working conditions.
See, e-g., Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445,457 (NJ. 1993). Courts allowing
such evidence indicate that it is directly relevant in establishing both the nature of the
workplace and its effects on a particular plaintiff. kd; see also Vinson v. Taylor, 753
F.2d 141, 146. (D.C. Cir. 1985). This is especially true because a woman could sue
even if she was not the direct target of the conduct. See, e.g., EEOC Guidelines, supra
note 46, § 1604.11(g) (indicating that when employment benefits are inappropriately
granted to an employee because she accepted sexual favors, employees qualified for,
but denied, those benefits also suffer sexual harassment); see also supra note 39 (indi-
cating that a plaintiff may have a Title VII claim even if she is not the direct target of
the harassment). Courts forbidding such testimony hold that, while it may be relevant
in a class action, it is not revealing in an individual lawsuit on the question of how
harassment has affected a particular plaintiff. Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 721
n.7 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
63. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
64. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Mich. 1993) (finding a prima facie
claim for sexual harassment based on a hostile environment where a doctor-supervi-
sor harassed a veterinary technician during a weekend shift while working alone with
her).
65. Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261,264-65 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (de-
tailing pattern of harassment, including that plaintiff's boss asked within her first hour
on the job whether she "fooled around," called her extension asking her to pant heav-
ily, and that salesmen in her office placed a camera under plaintiff Ross and took a
photograph up her dress).
66. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 161.
67. Id. at 161 & n.15.
68. Id
69. Id
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tives, one researcher estimated the cost of sexual harassment for a
Fortune 500 company to be $6.7 million annually in the form of re-
duced productivity, absenteeism, employee turnover, and the use of
internal complaint procedures. 70 Remarkably, this figure did not con-
sider litigation costs, including attorneys' fees or damages paid by a
company to any successful claimants. 71 These costly expenses of liti-
gation would raise the estimate astronomically. This $6.7 million fig-
ure breaks down to a cost of $282.53 per employee per year for each
Fortune 500 company.72 Minimal preventative efforts, on the other
hand, cost merely $8.41 per employee.73
Society also suffers as a consequence of sexual harassment; sexual
harassment "results in the creation of a female job ghetto in which a
large segment of the work force remains transient or abused in the job
market."'74 Society, like an employer, is also hurt economically when
business productivity is undermined. The costs of sexual harassment
are overwhelming to all parties involved. The next section provides
an introduction to those parties who bear the significant costs of the
harassment.
E. The Actors in a Sexual Harassment Incident and Their Interests
in Resolving the Dispute
Any alleged incident of sexual harassment revolves around three
primary actors: the employee, the employer, and the accused har-
asser. The alleged victim, or complainant, is likely to be a woman with
low income and little power.75 Harassment disproportionately targets
women working in predominantly male environments and women
who have been employed for fifteen years or less.76 While women of
limited means and, by inference, limited education are more likely to
be harassed, women with higher educational levels are more likely to
report the harassment.77
70. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings, supra note 6, at 207-14.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 214.
73. Id.
74. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 161 & n.15 (Mich. 1993).
75. Riger, supra note 6, at 198. When the victim is a member of a racial minority,
several courts allow "evidence of racial hostility [to] be aggregated with evidence of
sexual hostility in determining the extent to which the environment is hostile to the
plaintiff." Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D. Ariz. 1992); see also Hicks v.
Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (allowing racial and sexual
harassment to be considered together when evaluating hostile environment). One
scholar laments that there have been too few attempts to determine whether a wo-
man's race or ethnicity makes her a more likely target of harassment. Skaine, supra
note 32, at 182.
76. Bornstein, supra note 9, at 1-50.
77. Skaine, supra note 32, at 180 (indicating that women with college degrees were
overrepresented in the reporting rate, even though most victims "are in the lower
positions of occupational and educational structure").
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In the experience of one ombudsman involved with over 6000 sex-
ual harassment victims, over seventy-five percent of victims express
serious concern about some form of retaliatory or adverse conse-
quences flowing from their complaint.78 They are often worried not
only about disapproval from co-workers and supervisors, but also
about the complaint straining their personal relationships at home.79
Over fifty percent of victims appear very distressed, and they are con-
cerned about appearing oversensitive or even childish.' Many vic-
tims even blame themselves for the harassment. 1
Further, victims are not eager to take cases to court.' In fact,
although uncomfortable about involving a third party, most victims
feel that they are unable to rectify the situation on their own.1 A
majority of victims make clear that they do not want to lose control
over their complaint. It is very important to the complainants to
"have the chance to custom-design an approach to their concerns."84
Most victims are primarily interested in ending the harassment,8
rather than punitive or disciplinary remedies. They want assurance
that the conduct will not recur so they can quickly return to work.8
Some victims are also interested in a resolution that helps ensure that
someone else will not suffer harassment within their workplace.'
Employers' foremost aim, in contrast, is to maintain a productive
and harmonious workforce.88 Employers want to avoid negative pub-
licity and desire a fast, inexpensive end to any complaint of sexual
harassment.89 They want to provide their employees with, and be per-
ceived by their employees as providing, a "credible forum" for resolv-
ing workplace disputes. 90 Providing an appropriate dispute resolution
process may also satisfy the employer's legal responsibility to effec-
tively and promptly respond to a complaint.91
78. Rowe, supra note 3, at 164.
79. 1l
80. Id. at 165-66.
81. Howard Gadlin, Careful Maneuvers: Mediating Sexual Harassment, 7 Negotia-
tion J. 139, 144 (1991). In this sense, unfortunately, they are not alone in placing the
blame with themselves, as "[s]ociety has blamed women for letting [the harassment]
happen." Skaine, supra note 32, at 182.
82. See Rowe, supra note 3, at 165.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 162.
85. Id. at 165.
86. Gadlin, supra note 81, at 146.
87. Id. at 145.
88. Costello, supra note 4, at 16.
89. Id. at 16-17.
90. Id. at 17.
91. Andrea Williams, AAA's Sexual Harassment Claims Resolution Process, 20
Colo. Law. 1217, 1217 (1993); see, e.g., Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445,
463 (NJ. 1993) ("[T]he existence of effective preventative mechanisms provides some
evidence of due care on the part of the employer.").
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The accused harasser/employee also has an interest in how the dis-
pute will be resolved.92 Because sexual harassment primarily stems
from relative power imbalances within the workplace, the accused
harasser is overwhelmingly likely to be male.93 Specifically, men with
low self-esteem and entrenched traditional values demonstrate a pro-
pensity to harass.9a The harasser needs to know what specific behav-
ior caused offense and will likely appreciate the chance to explain his
behavior to the victim.95 Because harassers may be unaware that their
conduct was offensive, much less unlawful, some accused are inter-
ested in a forum where they can express remorse and will not be
treated as stereotypical harassers.96
Like the victim, the accused harasser would like to return to work
as quickly as possible, after a confidential resolution.97 Confidential-
ity is important to the accused because he is concerned about his repu-
tation and afraid of the possible repercussions on his relationships
with others at work.98 Unlike the victim, however, the accused is not
prone to self-blame. 99 On the contrary, the accused is likely to blame
the victim for his position in this dispute.100 Overall, the accused
would like a voice in the resolution process.' 0'
A successful dispute resolution process, then, must reconcile the
often conflicting interests of the complainant, the employer, and har-
asser. In addition, the fact-intensive nature of the typical sexual har-
assment complaint requires a flexible dispute resolution method
capable of assessing the complexities of each unique case. The next
part of this Note illustrates why litigation and arbitration do not meet
the needs of the parties. Ultimately, mediation is offered as the solu-
tion that best reconciles the parties' concerns.
II. LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: CURRENT METHODS OF
RESOLVING HARASSMENT DISPUTES
Litigation and arbitration are currently the most common fora for
resolving harassment disputes. From 1986 through 1987, more than
10,000 employment discrimination cases were filed in federal and state
92. Costello, supra note 4, at 16.
93. Skaine, supra note 32, at 183.
94. Id at 184.
95. Id
96. Mark S. Umbreit, Mediating Interpersonal Conflicts: A Pathway to Peace
144-45 (1995) ("Through open discussion of feelings, victim and offender can deal
with each other as people, oftentimes from the same neighborhood, rather than as
stereotypes and objects.").
97. Costello, supra note 4, at 16.
98. Gadlin, supra note 81, at 147.
99. Id.
100. Id
101. Williams, supra note 91, at 1217.
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courts."° In fact, employee litigation had been characterized as "one
of the 'growth industries' of the 1980s. ' 01 3 The following part assesses
the shortcomings of both litigation and arbitration as dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms for sexual harassment disputes.
A. Litigation
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has noted that "courtrooms are
not the best place to prevent or remedy a hostile work environ-
ment."'" Even if the plaintiff is successful at trial, the damage caused
to her relationships with her co-workers cannot be repaired." 5 Male
workers may resent changes in behavior required in the workplace
that are a result of a judicial order rather than being initiated by the
employer. 10 6
Furthermore, a court judgment lacks instructive value for employ-
ers, and ultimately only succeeds in labeling as sexual harassment the
particular incident in question in the litigation.107 Court opinions fail
to direct employers to specific changes that they should make in the
workplace;' the opinions neither guide employers toward legally
sound determinations of acceptable conduct, nor do they instruct em-
ployers how to educate employees about corporate antidiscrimination
policies. In addition, these court judgments do not involve the em-
ployer in effectuating change in the workplace."m
While courts may provide somewhat primitive justice, they are adju-
dicating claims increasingly more often." 0 Moreover, while the aver-
age nationwide award for sexual harassment is $38,500,111 the
amounts of the high-end awards are rising. In 1988, for example, the
largest settlement in a corporate sexual harassment suit was
$200,000.112 By 1991, it was more than $500,000.113 Furthermore, the
102. Alan F. Westin & Alfred G. Feliu, Resolving Employment Disputes Without
Litigation 1 (1988).
103. hL
104. Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 465 (NJ. 1993).
105. Id (citing Abrams, supra note 33, at 1215).
106. IL (citing Abrams, supra note 33, at 1216).
107. "Judgments-and even opinions-in sexual harassment cases give employers
only an anecdotal notion of what behavior is unacceptable, and otherwise fail to di-
rect employers toward more satisfactory behavior." Abrams, supra note 33, at 1216.
108. l
109. Id
110. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
111. Wayne N. Outten, Evaluating Plaintiffs Case and Settlement Opportunities:
Plaintiffs Perspective, in Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook
Series 7,21 (Practicing Law Institute 1996), available in WESTLAW, 12 LERCMS 33.
112. Carol Kleiman, Dealing with Harassment. Firms Seek Advice to Head Off Inci-
dents, Lawsuits, Chi. Trib., Oct. 15, 1991, at B1.
113. Id.
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Civil Rights Act of 1991 increased potential jury awards for both com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 114
What a judgment offers a harassment plaintiff is simple: money.
Courts may award a successful plaintiff compensatory damages, puni-
tive damages, and equitable relief in the form of reinstatement, back
pay, or attorney fees. 115 Thus, litigation attempts to convert the feel-
ings of complainants into dollars." 6 A judgment, however, is unlikely
to compensate the plaintiff for the economic investment, psychologi-
cal stress, and notoriety she incurs during the course of trial." 7
Indeed, these awards may be adequate for some Title VII sexual
harassment claims. A sexual harassment plaintiff, however, may have
a significant number of other legal grounds on which to bring suit. A
plaintiff may have grounds to bring claims for racial harassment, con-
structive discharge, retaliatory discharge, wrongful termination in vio-
lation of public policy, negligent supervision, breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, defamation, assault, battery, or rape, among other
bases."18
Once a plaintiff has chosen to file a Title VII suit, she will find that
the trial process is very difficult for harassment victims. The employee
is, in some sense, "on trial to determine if he or she 'deserved' to be
harassed.""' 9 Being harassed is emotionally distressing, but replaying
it in front of a judge or jury in public may be even more trauma-
tizing. 2 ° Discovery often compels a victim to reveal "raw" emotional
wounds that are "close to the surface."'' Further, a victim may be
forced to reveal private and personal information during the course of
a litigation."a The Supreme Court held in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson123 that courts may consider an alleged victim's past sexual be-
havior, including her dress and sexual fantasies, in making a determi-
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994) (allowing for punitive damages for discrimina-
tion violations committed with "malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual"); id. § 1981(b)(2) (indicating ceiling sums
for compensatory damages based on number of employees); Barry Winograd, Men as
Mediators in Cases of Sexual Harassment, Disp. Resol. J., Apr. 1995, at 40, 43.
115. Chan, supra note 44, at 25-26.
116. Andrea Williams, Model Procedures for Sexual Harassment Claims, Arb. J.,
Sept. 1993, at 66, 68.
117. Riger, supra note 6, at 208.
118. Chan, supra note 44, at 30-31.
119. Cohen, supra note 9, at 687. While this may help the court draw the line be-
tween acceptable personal relationships and unlawful behavior, see supra text accom-
panying notes 9-10, it could be "an invitation to attempt to discredit genuine victims
of sexual harassment." Cohen, supra note 9, at 687.
120. Margaret J. Grover, Mediation of Sexual Harassment Claims, in ABA Tort and
Insurance Practice Section Practice Tips 55, 55 (1995), available in WESTLAW, 24-
SPG Brief 55.
121. Winograd, supra note 114, at 41.
122. See Grover, supra note 120, at 55.
123. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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nation of sexual harassment.124 There is no rape shield law'2 that
would prevent a lawyer from asking about these issues at trial. De-
fense lawyers have asked prior sexual harassment complainants about
their past sexual experiences, incidences of childhood molestations,
abortions, and venereal disease. 26 In one case, a reporter in New
Mexico filed a sexual harassment complaint and, at trial, opposing
counsel produced gynecological records from her university and evi-
dence of discussions with her therapist. These discussions detailed
many of her early sexual experiences, including the fact that she had
been raped as a teenager. 12
Even in cases where the litigation is confined to the incident of the
alleged harassment itself, sexual harassment claims often come down
to the word of the complainant against the word of the alleged har-
asser. In all likelihood, no witnesses were present during the alleged
incident of harassment."m If both the complainant and the accused
are equally credible, judges and arbitrators will find for the har-
asser.'29 Further, the trial process tends to lend more credibility to a
more aggressive, articulate speaker; a male harasser is more likely
than a female complainant to speak in this style. 3 ' While plaintiffs
124. Id- at 69.
In practice, both traditional and nontraditional women may find that their
own actions are used against them in the unwelcomeness analysis. A woman
who behaves in the most stereotypical ways-complimenting men, straight-
ening their ties, "mov[ing] her body in a provocative manner," let alone eat-
ing dinner with the boss on a business trip, or remaining friendly even after
rejecting his advances-may find that the sexual advances she rejects are, as
a matter of law, not unwelcome. Similarly, women who act too much like
men-who use "crude and vulgar language," or choose to eat with the men
in the employee lunchroom--cannot be heard to complain of a worksite
which is "permeated by an extensive amount of lewd and vulgar conversa-
tion and conduct."
Chamallas, supra note 36, at 45 (citation omitted).
125. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 412 (restricting admission of evidence of victim's sexual
predisposition or other sexual behavior).
126. Ellen E. Schultz & Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs' Sex Lives Are
Being Laid Bare in Harassment Cases, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al.
127. Id at A9. The only available opinion in this case is an affirmance on appeal of
a grant of summary judgment to the employer. Stieber v. Journal Publishing Co., D.C.
No. CIV-93-648-LH, 1996 WL 599795, at *1 (10th Cir. 1996). The opinion lacks a
complete factual recitation. Id.
128. Susan D. Ross, Proving Sexual Harassment The Hurdles, 65 S. Cal. L Rev.
1451, 1451 (1992).
129. Stephen M. Crow & Clifford M. Koen, Sexual Harassment: New Challenge for
Labor Arbitrators?, Arb. J., June 1992, at 6, 8. Precisely because the unique situation
of sexual harassment leaves a plaintiff without other extrinsic evidence of the events,
she will often find it nearly impossible to prove that the harassment occurred. "[Tlhe
difficulties associated with proving one's claim probably have a chilling effect on the
willingness of a sexual harassment victim to file a grievance." Id.
130. Ross, supra note 128, at 1455.
[M]any women have a "powerless" speaking style that makes them less cred-
ible as witnesses than those using a "powerful" style. Research shows that
the "powerless" use "hedges" (like "I think"), "hesitation forms" (words like
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traditionally have an advantage over an employer in a jury trial, 131 the
litigation process is in some ways unfavorable toward a complainant.
The traditional plaintiff, the direct object of the harassment, is not
necessarily the only employee with a cause of action for sexual harass-
ment. Because employees other than those at whom the conduct is
directed may sue, 132 a sufficiently offensive environment could invite
suits from every woman in the workplace. In these cases, litigation
may not be an attractive option to the employer because the chances
for success are low. If an employer will almost certainly be held liable
after trial, it is in the employer's best interest to settle early rather
than investing in litigation.
Even when an employer chooses to litigate, he can never be sure
that a sexual harassment claim has been completely resolved. Be-
cause the employees may be able to bring subsequent claims on vari-
ous legal bases, some uncertainty surrounds the final resolution of any
sexual harassment dispute.' 33  After a plaintiff has unsuccessfully
sued under Title VII, for instance, she may still bring a viable claim, if
not barred by the statute of limitations, for battery or negligence. 134 If
dismissed, the harasser might also have a cause of action challenging
the dismissal. Federal employees, for example, may appeal adverse
employment decisions, such as dismissals as a result of sexual harass-
ment, to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 135 Ultimately, decisions
of the Merit Systems Protection Board may also be appealed in fed-
"urn"), "polite forms" (such as "sir"), and "question intonation" (declaring
something with "rising intonation so as to convey uncertainty.") The re-
search study showed:
[W]itnesses of low social status-the poor and uneducated-were
most likely to use this style of testimony. Female witnesses used
the style more frequently than men. . . . Those witnesses in the
taped trials whose social status in court was higher-for example,
well-educated, white collar men and expert witnesses of both
sexes-tended to use a style that exhibited relatively few features
of the powerless style.
Id. (quoting John M. Conley et al., The Power of Language: Presentations Style in the
Courtroom, 1978 Duke L.J. 1375, 1380-81, 1386). But see Deborah Tannen, You Just
Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation 225 (1990) ("If a linguistic
strategy is used by a woman, it is seen as powerless; if it is done by a man, it is seen as
powerful. Often, the labeling of 'women's language' as 'powerless language' reflects
the view of women's behavior through the lens of men's.").
131. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
132. For example, in a quid pro quo case, a qualified woman who was denied bene-
fits because they were conferred on someone in a sexual relationship with the boss
could sue. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Similarly, in a hostile environ-
ment case, a plaintiff need not be the direct target of the illegal conduct to be afforded
a legal remedy. See supra note 39.
133. Cohen, supra note 9, at 685.
134. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (1994) ("An employee, or applicant for employment, may
submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board from any action which is
appealable to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation.").
2506 [Vol. 65
SEXUAL HARASSMENT DISPUTES
eral court.136 Many collective bargaining agreements also grant simi-
lar challenge power to employees. 137 If an employer dismisses a
harasser employee, that employee could challenge the termination. If
the employer takes no action, the victim could sue under Title VII or
file another related claim. Thus, an employer may be vulnerable to
additional legal suits filed by either the victimized employee or the
alleged harasser, even after the first litigation is completed.
In most cases, litigation is an unattractive choice for the victim, the
harasser, and the employer. While the victim does have an advantage
at trial, to capitalize on her advantage she must endure a psychologi-
cally grueling trial where her personal affairs will become a matter of
public record. The harasser will suffer damage to relationships with
his coworkers as a result of the public proceedings in which he was not
necessarily permitted to participate. Whether the employer pays a
handsome award or wins at trial, he can never be sure that he will not
be summoned to appear in court again to defend a claim based on the
very same incident. As a result, litigation is largely ineffective at
resolving sexual harassment disputes.
B. Arbitration
Alternative Dispute Resolution, or "ADR," as it is commonly
known, refers to alternatives to trial. Arbitration is one of the most
common ADR methods. ADR has been endorsed by numerous legis-
lative provisions, including the Civil Justice Reform Act of 19901m and
the now-expired Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990.139
Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empower judges to pro-
mote alternatives to trial during pretrial conferences.?4
ADR options within the workplace can be either "internal" or "ex-
ternal."''1 Common external procedures in the employment context
include negotiation,142 mediation,'4 3 arbitration,'" and mini-trial. 145
136. Id. § 7703(a)(1) ("Any employee or applicant for employment adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board
may obtain judicial review of the order or decision.").
137. Cohen, supra note 9, at 686.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1994).
139. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1994).
140. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
141. Charles P. O'Connor & Anita W. Coupe, Employment ADR: There Is More
Than Meets the Eye, Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Aug. 1995, at 10. External proce-
dures traditionally involve third parties, such as arbitrators or mediators, while inter-
nal procedures happen within the company without the assistance of a third party. See
id.
142. Negotiation has been characterized as "the mainstay of dispute resolution."
Containing Legal Costs: ADR Strategies for Corporations, Law Firms, and Govern-
ment 10 (Erika S. Fine ed., 1988) [hereinafter Containing Legal Costs.
143. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
144. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
145. The mini-trial is defined as an "abbreviated case presentation[ I made by coun-
sel to principals from each side and, if desired, a neutral advisor of the parties' choos-
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The internal procedures available include fact finding,146 negotiation,
and peer review.
Arbitration is a dispute resolution method where "a neutral third
party (arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at which both par-
ties have an opportunity to be heard.' 1 47 Binding arbitration com-
prises a part of almost every collective bargaining agreement that
unions negotiate, 148 and is instrumental in the resolution of many
types of workplace disputes. The use of arbitration in the workplace
is increasingly more popular because of its ability to "present viable
solutions for dealing with problems which are peculiar to the work-
place."'14 9 Arbitration is useful in cases where employment strife in
the form of imminent labor strikes can be averted without lengthy
litigation.
However, because all arbitration awards can be reviewed by courts,
arbitration is not final or binding.'5 0 Historically, mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in workplace manuals produced a wealth of litigation as to
their enforceability.' 5 ' The Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 52 however, upheld the enforceability of a mandatory arbitra-
tion clause, which foreclosed the plaintiff from filing an age discrimi-
nation suit.' 53 Presumably, the same outcome would result in a Title
VII sexual harassment case, so long as the plaintiff was not duped into
signing the contract.' 54 Interestingly, the EEOC cautions against
mandatory arbitration clauses in Title VII cases, advising that arbitra-
ing. . . . Afterwards, the [parties] meet on their own to negotiate settlement."
Containing Legal Costs, supra note 142, at 8. The drawback to a mini-trial is that the
role of the neutral advisor is to assess the viability of each side's position, but not
necessarily to encourage or facilitate settlement. See id.
146. In fact-finding, a neutral third party with expertise in the substantive legal area
(i.e., sexual harassment) reviews the case and evaluates dispute facts. Id. at 9-10.
147. Black's Law Dictionary 70 (abr. 6th ed. 1991). Arbitration is "the most rigid
and often the least satisfactory method[ ] of conflict resolution for the participants."
Jay Folberg & Alison Taylor, Mediation 26 (1984).
148. Peter M. Panken et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90's, 69, 73 (A.L.I.IA.B.A. Dec. 5, 1996),
available in WESTLAW, SB 31 ALI-ABA 69.
149. George H. Singer, Employing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Working at
Finding Better Ways to Resolve Employer-Employee Strife, 72 N.D. L. Rev. 299, 301
(1996).
150. See Vern E. Hauck, Introduction to Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Cases 1-1,
1-3 (Vern E. Hauck ed., 1995).
151. Nancy Sedmak, Arbitration of Discrimination Claims Should Not Be
Mandatory, Panelists Say, 153 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-3 (Aug. 9, 1995).
152. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
153. Id at 33.
154. The Ninth Circuit refused to compel arbitration in a sexual harassment case,
however, where the plaintiff was not given enough information about the arbitration
clause of the contract. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995). "[A] Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to
forego her statutory remedies and arbitrate her claims if she has knowingly agreed to
submit such disputes to arbitration." Id.
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tion should only be appropriate when the parties agreed to arbitrate
after the claim arose. 5
The process of arbitration weighs in favor of the employer. 5 6 First,
claims against supervisors are unlikely to fall within a mandatory arbi-
tration clause in the labor context because supervisors are not nor-
mally part of the bargaining unit." Even if arbitration is offered
under a given collective bargaining agreement, therefore, a plaintiff
who is harassed by her supervisor will be unable to avail herself of the
arbitration option. In addition, the arbitrator pool is largely lacking in
any gender or racial diversity; the panel of arbitrators that is likely
available for a sexual harassment claim is ninety-seven percent white,
with eighty-nine percent of the panel comprised of highly educated
males with an average age of over sixty years old. 158 Fmially, because
a minimal number of arbitration decisions are published, it is diffi-
cult for employers with mandatory arbitration clauses to discern ille-
gal conduct.' 60
The employer is often interested in retaining a working relationship
with the accused harasser; if internal policy forces the employer to
discharge an employee, and the discharge is later upheld in arbitra-
tion, the relationship between the harasser and the employer will be
severed. Harassers, however, are not always discharged by arbitra-
tors. In fact, arbitrators often prefer a corrective discipline, some-
where short of discharge,' 6' in the hopes that the relationships
between the parties could continue. "Unfortunately, corrective disci-
pline is not always successful. Arbitral awards that are unsuccessfid in
rehabilitating sexual harassers thwart the public policy against sexual
harassment by placing an employee in the workplace who will con-
tinue to sexually harass others."'1'
155. Panken et al., supra note 148, at 80.
156. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
157. Hauck, supra note 150, at 1-21.
158. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You
Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 Drake L. Rev. 255, 287-88 (1994).
159. Hauck, supra note 150, at 1-21 ("Published labor arbitration awards represent
a small portion of the total number of grievances dealing with sexual harassment arbi-
trated each year ....").
160. Some generalizations about sexual harassment in the arbitration context can
be drawn, and this information is useful in helping parties to a harassment dispute
evaluate the viability of the claim. For instance, arbitrators consistently uphold dis-
charges of harassers where there has been physical touching of any kind, including a
kiss on the cheek. William A. Nowlin, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How
Arbitrators Rule, 43 Arb. J. 31, 38 (1988). In general, the harasser will be discharged
by an arbitrator when the harassment was excessive, when it occurred without re-
morse, when it affected the working environment, or when it tarnished the company's
public image. Hauck, supra note 150, at 1-22.
161. Chris Baker, Comment, Sexual Harassment v. Labor Arbitration: Does Rein-
stating Sexual Harassers Violate Public Policy?, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1361, 1381-82
(1993).
162. Id. at 1383.
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Once an arbitrator has issued an award, parties may still end up in
court. Courts can review arbitration awards, 63 and those who do
must balance two competing policies: the public policy against sexual
harassment, and the judicial policy favoring the finality of arbitration
awards. 164 Any weighing of public policy invites challenges by parties
unhappy with the arbitrator's decision.' 65 As one commentator notes,
"[t]he longer a labor relations dispute is allowed to go on, the greater
the risk of hostility, mistrust, and disaffection.' 1 66 Arbitration is ill-
suited for sexual harassment disputes because it lacks both the flexi-
bility of negotiation and the safeguards of litigation. The next part
offers mediation as the most effective and efficient forum for resolving
most sexual harassment disputes.
III. THE PROCESS OF MEDIATION
Mediation may be the best choice for resolving most sexual harass-
ment disputes. To be effective, a resolution system must ultimately
meet the majority of the concerns of all parties. Mediation is able to
reconcile the widely differing concerns of the actors in a case of sexual
harassment. 67 The next section begins by introducing mediation, and
then explains why it is uniquely suited for the sexual harassment
arena.
A. Definition of Mediation
Mediation, defined as "the use of a third-party neutral to intervene
between two parties who are in conflict,"' 68 is a highly flexible dispute
163. Singer, supra note 149, at 321.
[C]ourts generally limit their review to the consideration of whether the ar-
bitrator performed the assigned role. The review of an arbitrator's adher-
ence to performance standards does not, in theory, involve scrutiny of the
award itself. The sufficiency of the evidence on which an arbitrator bases his
or her decision is likewise not a matter for judicial review. In this regard,
appeal rights do not generally parallel those commonly found in civil litiga-
tion; errors of fact or law by the arbitrator are usually not subject to review
on appeal.
Id. (citations omitted).
164. Baker, supra note 161, at 1361.
165. Douglas E. Ray, Sexual Harassment, Labor Arbitration and National Labor
Policy, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 812, 829-30 (1994).
166. Id at 830.
167. See supra part I.E.
168. Adam J. Conti, Mediation of Work-Place Disputes: A Prescription for Organi-
zational Health, 11 Employee Rel. LJ. 291, 291 (1985). Folberg and Taylor, profes-
sors at Lewis and Clark Law School, offer the following definition of mediation:
Mediation is first and foremost a process that transcends the content of the
conflict it is intended to resolve .... It can be defined as the process by which
the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons,
systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider
alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their
needs .... The most useful way to look at mediation is to see it as a goal-
directed, problem-solving intervention.
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resolution method. Mediation seeks to reach an agreement about fit-
ture conduct, not to place blame with one party or the other.16 9 Medi-
ation explores the legal and non-legal issues and, more importantly,
the options for resolving them.170 Although the process of mediation
is flexible and can be modified at any time prior to, or even during,
the mediation session, the following is a representative sampling of
the various procedural aspects of the mediation session.
The mediator 7' traditionally begins with an initial joint session,
where all parties are present, during which the mediator introduces
both himself and the process.'" The parties then give opening state-
ments without interruption by the other parties to give the mediator
an overview of the dispute.' 73 The mediator proceeds to meet with
each party separately. During these meetings or "caucuses," the me-
diator works with the parties to define the central issues through the
use of open-ended questions. 74 The mediator focuses on developing
the trust of the parties during these caucus sessions. 75 Once the is-
sues are identified, the primary goal is to generate options for resolv-
ing the dispute.' 76 These proposed resolutions become the focus of
the mediation as the parties, through the mediator, evaluate those op-
tions and negotiate an acceptable solution." Traditionally, the medi-
ator or a party then drafts the solution into a written contract signed
by both parties, which is the culmination of a successful mediation. 78
B. Mediation Is the Most Appropriate Method for Resolving Most
Sexual Harassment Disputes
The primary reason to choose mediation is because, put simply, it
works. In general, mediation resolves the conflict in question an esti-
Folberg & Taylor, supra note 147, at 7-8.
169. Charles A. Bethel & Linda R. Singer, Mediation: A New Remedyfor Cases of
Domestic Violence, 7 Vt. L. Rev. 15, 17 (1982) (describing mediation as "prospectively
rather than retrospectively oriented").
170. Conti, supra note 168, at 295.
Through this process of exploration and understanding, resolution is ap-
proached by one of three ways-by each side making movement toward a
common ground, by the realization of one or both parties that the actual
problem was something other than initially perceived, or through the syner-
gistic effect of the process itself, which is the most creative approach.
Id
171. The mediator is the "[n]eutral third person who helps disputing parties to
reach agreement through the mediation process." Black's Law Dictionary 678 (abr.
6th ed. 1991).
172. Folberg & Taylor, supra note 147, at 39-41.
173. Id at 40-42.
174. Id at 41-43.
175. Id at 38-40.
176. See id. at 49-50.
177. d at 53-58.
178. Id at 60-62.
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mated eighty-five percent of the time.17 9 Countless attorneys have en-
dorsed mediation as particularly appropriate in sexual harassment
cases. 180 The EEOC itself instituted a pilot ADR program in 1992
employing voluntary mediation as a means to resolve various discrimi-
nation disputes.' 8 ' The program had an ultimate success rate of more
than fifty percent, with ninety-two percent of the parties rating the
mediation process as "very fair" or "fair.' 182 The remedies varied
from cash settlement and changes in employment status to
apologies.'8
3
Because of its flexibility, mediation works especially well when sen-
sitivity to emotional issues is required, as in cases of sexual harass-
ment."8 Mediation, because it is ultimately guided by the concerns of
the parties, is responsive to the factual pattern in any given case. As
such, mediation is appropriate for resolving disputes involving either
quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual harassment.185
179. Cindy C. Ettingoff & Gregory Powell, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Employment-Related Disputes, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1131, 1135 (1996).
Mediation has been used to resolve collective bargaining impasses between
unions and management since at least as early as 1947.... Mediation has
also been used recently to aid parties in reaching divorce settlements; as an
alternative to small claims court; and.. . to resolve a broad variety of dis-
putes ranging from minor criminal offenses to landlord-tenant
disagreements.
Conti, supra note 168, at 292 (citations omitted).
180. See, e.g., Aswad, supra note 5, at A-9 (quoting Berkley, California attorney
Amy Oppenheimer in support of mediation because it "gives [parties] a chance to be
heard"); Mediation Can Work Well Adjudicating Sex Harassment Claims, ABA Panel
Says, 155 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-9 (Aug. 15, 1994), available in WESTLAW, 1994
DLR 155 D9 (stating that attorneys from San Francisco and Florida firms recom-
mended mediation for sexual harassment claims at ABA annual meeting); Simon J.
Nadel, Sexual Harassment: Costly Workplace Incidents Persist; Innovative Ap-
proaches Recommended, 88 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) CC-1, CC-2 (May 7, 1996) ("New
York attorney Brody [senior counsel to the labor and employment group of Gibney,
Anthony & Flaherty] proposes mediation as a solution to sexual harassment charges,
noting that because sexual harassment is a 'profound interpersonal problem,' address-
ing it requires discussion and accommodation."); Sedmak, supra note 151, at C-3 (list-
ing lawyers from New York and San Francisco extolling mediation for sexual
harassment cases, partly because of its educative element); Sexual Harassment Claims
Prime Area for Mediation, Attorney Tells Seminar, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-4
(July 10, 1992), available in WESTLAW, 133 DLR A-4 (indicating that Washington,
D.C. attorneys James Heller and Francine Weiss endorsed mediation for sexual har-
assment claims).
181. Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 179, at 1150.
182. Id. at 1151.
183. ld.
184. See James K. Hoenig, Mediation in Sexual Harassment. Balancing the Sensitiv-
ities, Disp. Resol. J., Dec. 1993, at 51, 53.
185. The adversarial approach of traditional litigation, on the other hand, is
"uniquely unsuited to resolving these claims ... [because it] has difficulty in appreci-
ating the gradations along the sexual harassment continuum." Williams, supra note
116, at 68.
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The choice of the forum for a sexual harassment case can be abso-
lutely critical to its outcome.' 6 While the employer typically has an
edge over the victim in arbitration, the victim tends to be more suc-
cessful in a trial where she can present her case to a jury."s Media-
tion, in contrast to either of these options, is a forum without a
predisposition to either party. Ultimately, the use of mediation results
in less resentment between the parties, as well as less emotional and
financial involvement." s
The actual process of mediation also makes it a more desirable dis-
pute resolver than arbitration for sexual harassment plaintiffs. In a
recent study, 77% of the claimants who mediated their disputes were
satisfied with the process, compared with only 45% of those whose
disputes went to arbitration.18 9 This greater satisfaction is not surpris-
ing in light of the amount of control that complainants are able to
exercise over the mediation process 90 compared to the much lesser
degree of control they have in an arbitration. For these reasons, com-
plainants should be eager to exercise their right to mediation.
Allowing the mediator flexibility in guiding the process of the medi-
ation session enables him to help the parties reach a resolution. The
mediator may offer himself as a scapegoat during a joint session, for
example, by suggesting a ridiculous resolution to the controversy. 91
In response, the parties can begin a fruitful pattern of agreement by
uniting to reject the mediator's proposal. The mediator may also find
it useful to give the parties control over certain elements of the media-
tion procedures, such as the timing, that are not crucial to the media-
tion but are points on which the parties can begin to agree. The
timing of a mediation session, for example, is an unlikely source of
conflict between the parties, because the entire mediation process is
often completed in a day or less."9 In fact, the rapid resolution of
mediation makes it particularly appealing when compared to the often
time-consuming choices of arbitration and litigation. 9 3
In addition to the ability to control the mediation process, parties
have a greater opportunity to exercise control over the sohtion to
186. Sedmak, supra note 151, at C-3.
187. Idt
188. Michael D. Young, How to Use ADR to Your Advantage: Effective Participa-
tion in the Mediation Process, in How to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution to Your
Advantage 65, 79 (1995) (on file with the Fordhan Law Review).
189. Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perspectives on the Dif-ferences Between Mediation and Arbitration, 6 Negotiation J. 249, 250-51 (1990).
190. See infra part V.D. While the mediator has discretion in structuring a media-
tion, there is no preset course that the mediation must take. As such, parties are in
the position to make procedural requests of the mediator.
191. Jack Etheridge, Mending Fences: Mediation in the Community, in Dispute
Resolution Devices in a Democratic Society 73, 77 (The Roscoe Pound-American
Trial Lawyers Foundation 1985).
192. Conti, supra note 168, at 302.
193. Grover, supra note 120, at 56.
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their own dispute in mediation than in any other dispute resolution
method. 9 4 In both arbitration and litigation, an arbitrator or judge
has the final and only say over the resolution of the dispute. 195 Media-
tion is a distinctly different process of dispute resolution from litiga-
tion and arbitration; it is not a compressed, informal trial. The
primary goal in mediation is to reach an agreement about the future
conduct or relationships between the parties, not to assign blame for
the alleged incident of harassment. 6
This focus on the future cannot be overemphasized in cases of sex-
ual harassment. Both the complainant and the alleged harasser may
be interested in continuing their employment, and the employer is
likely to be interested in a continuing relationship with one or both of
the employees. In these circumstances, mediation is the best dispute
resolution method because the financial costs are shared by the par-
ties, giving them a greater personal stake in the process and its
outcome.
197
Further, mediation may preserve the quality of any continuing rela-
tionship because the parties are centrally involved in crafting the final
agreement. Each party to a mediation, in contrast to parties of other
dispute resolution methods, is more likely to perceive the ultimate
outcome as "fair."' 98 As a result, if and when the parties return to the
workplace, the workplace relationships have suffered less damage
than if a "winner" and a "loser" had been declared, as in an arbitra-
tion or at trial.
Within the workplace, employers have an interest in encouraging
the reporting of incidents of sexual harassment, out of concern for
both their employees and the productivity of the company, and be-
cause it is their legal obligation to maintain a workplace free from
discrimination.'99 Internal grievance procedures, and particularly the
mediation procedure detailed below, 200 can help shield employers
from legal liability when an employee sues on a sexual harassment
194. See Michael W. Hawkins, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Alternative for
Resolving Employment Litigation and Disputes, 20 N. Ky. L. Rev. 493, 494-95 (1993).
195. Because both judges and arbitrators render decisions the parties are bound by
law or contract to accept, the parties have no influence over the specific terms of the
remedy granted.
196. Folberg & Taylor, supra note 147, at 8 ("Mediation is more concerned with
how the parties will resolve the conflict and create a plan than with personal
histories.").
197. Grover, supra note 120, at 55-56.
198. Conti, supra note 168, at 302. Additionally, mediation should be preferred
because even if an employee would otherwise have wanted to remain in the work-
place, the acrimonious nature of litigation and arbitration may sever the relationship
between the parties, making continued employment impossible.
199. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
200. See infra part IV.B.
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claim.20' This is especially true in cases where the employee chooses
not to utilize the internal procedures that the employer offered."z'
Of the available internal options, mediation is the better choice for
a complainant, as it will provide a greater opportunity for her to be
heard. Mediation is also highly flexible as to timing, scope, and for-
mat. The mediator should structure the mediation in such a way that
the parties feel they have a chance to tell their side of the story.203
This allows parties to "vent" about the emotional issues that are com-
mon in sexual harassment disputes2° in a way that is not possible
within the rigid confines of litigation. Because both parties are inter-
ested in telling their version of the events-regardless of whether their
story is legally relevant-mediation is often very effective at defusing
volatile situations."0 5 In contrast, a trial rarely allows the parties an
opportunity to be heard without being rushed by their counsel or op-
posing counsel.206
While one writer expressed hesitation in endorsing mediation in
cases of sexual harassment, noting the potential discrepancies in
power between the complainant employee and the employer,20 7 at
least one feminist legal scholar has indicated that there is no evidence
that a litigator, in comparison to a mediator, can better help a woman
overcome any power imbalance.2 °a The mediator can structure the
mediation to account for any power imbalances between the parties.
This is, in fact, the mediator's job-to neutralize power imbalances.209
The mediator may choose, for example, to suspend the initial joint
meeting so that the parties are not forced to meet face-to-face at the
outset of the mediation. In fact, the mediator may not require that the
201. Amy Holzman, Note, Denial of Attorney's Fees for Claims of Sexual Harass-
ment Resolved Through Informal Dispute Resolution: A Shield for Employers, A
Sword Against Women, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 245,248-50 (1994). "[A] company can do
much to... avoid liability for hostile environment sexual harassment if it can show
that... it has promulgated a company policy against sexual harassment that encour-
ages employees to notify the company of any such claim ... ." John L Valentino, An
Effective Employer Response to Complaints of Sexual Harassment, N.Y. St. BJ., Mar.-
Apr. 1996, at 36, 37-38. Having a dispute resolution process in place can also help an
employer avoid suits by the accused "claiming damages arising from the charges made
against [him]." Williams, supra note 26, at 1218; see also Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,
626 A.2d 445, 463 (N.J. 1993) (holding that preventative measures can be evidence of
"due care").
202. Holzman, supra note 201, at 250.
203. See Grover, supra note 120, at 56.
204. See id.; Hoenig, supra note 184, at 53.
205. See Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 179, at 1160.
206. Aswad, supra note 5, at A-9.
207. See Irvine, supra note 23, at 50.
208. Janet Rifkdn, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2
J.L. & Inequality 21, 30 (1984).
209. Mediation Can Work Well Adjudicating Sex Harassment Claims, ABA Panel
Says, supra note 180, at D-9. ("Mediation seeks to neutralize the power that one party
has over the other and to put both parties in a position to negotiate.").
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parties ever negotiate face-to-face because of the sensitivity of issues
in a sexual harassment dispute. 10
The same critic of mediation has argued that victims should avoid
mediation because it "risks trivializing the seriousness of sexual har-
assment."'2 1' Under this view, mediation does not do enough to set
appropriate standards for workplace conduct because the level of pub-
lic discipline that harassers receive is somehow a "reflection" of wo-
men's progress in the workplace.1 2 Mediation, however, does no
more damage than pre-trial settlements or arbitrations with unpub-
lished decisions. In addition, the court opinions that result from litiga-
tion are similarly criticized because they often fail to set real standards
for employers.1 3 This argument also implies that an individual victim
desiring a private resolution of her complaint should choose litigation
to preserve the uniformity of sexual harassment law. No one would
advocate litigation for a tort plaintiff who wanted to settle, however,
and there is no compelling reason why a sexual harassment complain-
ant should be treated any differently.2 14
Mediation expands the potential for alternative resolutions for com-
plainants seeking relief that is not solely monetary. 5 The outcomes
in mediation can range from an agreed-upon cash settlement amount
to more individualized solutions. Indeed, "[i]n mediation, the reme-
dies are limited only by the imagination and willingness of the parties,
their counsel, and the mediator. 2 1 6 Arbitrators, like judges, are un-
likely to offer such nontraditional remedies.21 7 In mediating sexual
harassment claims, the parties can explore solutions such as the fol-
210. See Gadlin, supra note 81, at 149; Grover, supra note 120, at 55; Thomas F.
Levak, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) Option, 12 LERC Monograph Ser. 33, 35 (1993), available in WESTLAW, 12
LERCMS 33.
211. Irvine, supra note 23, at 28.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
214. While sexual harassment is indeed a different cause of action than a garden
variety tort action, neither potential plaintiff should be forced to litigate. Sexual har-
assment plaintiffs have already been victimized because of their gender, and com-
plainants should not be forced to subordinate their choice of an alternative dispute
resolution method to contribute to a body of sexual harassment law. This is particu-
larly so in light of court opinions' failure to educate the workplace and its inhabitants
about what conduct is illegal. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. Ironi-
cally, the author advancing the argument against mediation quotes the following in
support of the proposition that women should litigate: "'[F]orcing unwilling women
to take part in a process which involves much personal exposure sends a powerful
social message: it is permissible to discount the real experience of women in the ser-
vice of someone else's idea of what will be good for them... or good for the system."'
Irvine, supra note 23, at 50 (quoting Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 Yale LJ. 1545, 1607 (1991)). This is, however, precisely why
women should not be forced to litigate their sexual harassment claims.
215. See infra part V.H.
216. Costello, supra note 4, at 21.
217. Levak, supra note 210, at 34.
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lowing: education rather than punishment;218 transfers, retraining,
counseling, back pay;219 disciplining of the offender, separation of of-
fender and victim, office-wide training, updated complaint
processes;220 letters of reference, or job modifications. 2
A personal apology can also function as a remedy in a sexual har-
assment case. An acknowledgment of the offensiveness of the har-
asser's conduct from the harasser himself" helps relieve the victim of
her feelings of self-doubt.3 The harasser also benefits from the op-
portunity mediation provides to truly understand the position of the
person he has offended, and to offer a sincere apology.' 4 Apologiz-
ing can often go a long way in defusing the difficult emotional issues in
a sexual harassment case so that the parties can focus on the future
relationships. Litigation and arbitration never offer this opportunity
to the parties.
Unlike mediation, litigation focuses too much on what a claim is
worth, reducing every claim to a dollar amount.225 The solutions
reached in mediation, in contrast to those imposed by judges in a liti-
gation setting, are more likely to endure and be respected by the par-
ties. 2 6 This is certainly a result of the input the parties had in shaping
the resolution to best fit their needs. Consider, for example, an em-
ployer who agrees through mediation to pay a complainant employee
$X in damages and to revise the complaint procedure in the work-
place. The employer is unlikely to resent the terms of the agreement
he helped design. The complainant employee is also more likely to
view the employer as willing to remedy the situation, rather than sim-
ply accepting the determination forced upon him by the court.
The employer also benefits from mediation's remedy scheme, espe-
cially when the alternative is litigation. Litigation is often unsatisfac-
tory to the employer because it is an "all or nothing" dispute
resolution method.227 Methods of alternative dispute resolution, such
218. Gadlin, supra note 81, at 145-46.
219. Levak, supra note 210, at 34-35.
220. Grover, supra note 120, at 57.
221. Williams, supra note 91, at 1219.
222. Wimograd, supra note 114, at 41 ("For some victims, the need to hear an ac-
knowledgment that conduct was offensive, coupled with an apology for the uninvited
action, will be a necessary precondition for the negotiation and acceptance of more
traditional forms of relief."); see also Williams, supra note 116, at 73 (suggesting "let-
ters of apology" as a creative remedy in sexual harassment mediations).
223. Wimograd, supra note 114, at 43.
224. See Hoenig, supra note 184, at 51.
225. Grover, supra note 120, at 57. This is not to imply that women should not be
financially compensated for any injuries they suffer as a result of workplace sexual
harassment, but merely that money may not be the only, or perhaps even the fore-
most, remedy in which employees are interested.
226. Id at 56-57.
227. Levak, supra note 210, at 33.
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as mediation, eliminate the possibility of a highly inflated jury
verdict.228
Overall, mediation is an excellent dispute resolver for a company
put off by the exorbitant legal costs of taking every incident of alleged
sexual harassment to trial.2 9 The number of employment claims is
skyrocketing2 30 and, along with it, the number of women in the work-
place is rising as well. Women are projected to comprise nearly half
the workforce by the year 2000.231 Timely mediation can save over
80% of the court and counsel costs of litigation.232 Mediation is the
least expensive and the least disruptive dispute resolution method
available. 133 The fast resolution improves employee relationships and
guarantees fewer lost employee hours."' In addition, in house coun-
sel, rather than outside counsel, can handle the employer's case, re-
ducing expenses for attorney's fees. 35
The complainant employee also saves money by choosing media-
tion. She will often get a settlement before she can accrue much in
attorney's fees.236 Further, she avoids the trouble of securing repre-
sentation to litigate. For a blue-collar worker, a $2500 or $5000 re-
tainer essentially constitutes a bar to any representation.237 Many
attorneys will not take a plaintiff's sexual harassment case in any
event, and certainly not on a contingency basis.238 Plaintiffs' attorneys
know the case will require an inordinate time commitment to compete
with what will likely be a higher-financed defense by the employer.2 39
Mediation is a cost-effective, time-efficient solution that allows all
the parties to participate in the formulation of an acceptable result to
the conflict. Unlike the options of arbitration and litigation, media-
tion allows the parties to exercise greater control over the remedy of
the dispute. For these reasons, employers should integrate mediation
into their dispute resolution policies and encourage employees to me-
diate any sexual harassment disputes that arise. The next part offers a
228. Cindy Fuzzi, Book Review, Disp. Resol. J., Jan. 1995, at 85 (reviewing Julie M.
Tamminen's Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Managing Corporate Policy
(1994)).
229. See Meredith, supra note 2, at 62.
230. Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 179, at 1133 (citing Steven M. Kaufman & John
A. Charin, Directing the Flood: The Arbitration of Employment Claims, 10 Lab. Law.
217 (1994)).
231. Lamont E. Stallworth & Martin H. Main, Workforce Diversity, Disp. Resol. J.,
June 1994, at 28.
232. Judith Meyer, Mediation Works... With the Least Damage Done to the Parties'
Egos and Pocketbooks, Disp. Resol. J., Apr.-June 1995, at 46.
233. Grover, supra note 120, at 55-56.
234. IL at 56.
235. Jeanne C. Miller, ADR in Employment Matters, in How to Use Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Your Advantage, supra note 188, at 163.
236. I&
237. Howard, supra note 158, at 289.
238. Costello, supra note 4, at 19; Howard, supra note 158, at 288.
239. Costello, supra note 4, at 19.
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sample mediation provision that should be part of an employer's dis-
pute resolution policy.
IV. CONTRACTUAL MEDIATION FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Evaluating dispute resolution procedures after a dispute has arisen
is not effective for an employer. As the EEOC guides, "[p]revention
is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment."240 This part
outlines a general sexual harassment policy and focuses on the role of
mediation within that policy by offering a sample mediation clause for
inclusion in an employment contract or employee handbook.
A. Sexual Harassment Policy, Generally
Every company's larger policy targeting sexual harassment should
provide for mediation of any disputes that arise. To be successful, a
corporation's policy should "increas[e] the reporting rate and
decreas[e] the actual incidence [of sexual harassment]." 41 For the
policy to be effective, it should: (a) be in writing; (b) be given to all
employees; (c) make clear that sexual harassment of any kind will ab-
solutely not be tolerated; (d) provide a clear definition of sexual har-
assment, complete with examples of behavior that would be
unacceptable under the regulations; (e) provide for education and
training programs; (f) indicate the appropriate procedure for filing a
complaint; (g) indicate procedures for resolving the complaint, includ-
ing any appeals procedures open to employees; (h) reassure that com-
plainants will not be retaliated against for filing such a complaint; (i)
indicate that all claims will be investigated; and (j) note that all meri-
torious claims will be appropriately remedied.242 A mediation clause
would comprise only a small part of a company's complete sexual har-
assment policy, falling here under part (g), the appropriate procedures
for resolution of the complaint. While mediation would be but one
element of such a policy, it is a crucial one. Once a dispute has arisen,
in spite of the educative elements of the policy, the dispute resolution
choice is of paramount importance.
The EEOC has indicated that an effective ADR program, such as a
mediation clause, must focus on voluntariness, confidentiality, and
neutrality.243 What follows is a suggested sample mediation provi-
240. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 46, § 1604.11(0.
241. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings, supra note 6, at 198 (statement of Dr.
Freada Klein).
242. See Valentino, supra note 201, at 38; Michael B. Reuben & Isaac M. Zucker,
Remedying Sexual Harassment: A Primer, Litig., Winter 1995, at 44.
243. EEOC Policy Statement on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 137 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) A-1 (July 18, 1995).
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sion, addressing these central considerations, as well as the media-
tion's structure, costs, and settlement options.2 "
B. Proposed Contractual Provision for Mediation
I. Proposal of Mediation
1. Any party to an alleged incident of sexual harassment may initi-
ate mediation at such time the party becomes aware there is an
alleged incident of sexual harassment. A party is defined for
purposes of this provision as a complainant employee, an al-
leged harasser, or the employer. The party initiating the media-
tion must give written notice to all parties to the mediation,
including the alleged victim, the alleged harasser, and the
employer.
2. This notice must indicate that a response, either accepting or
declining mediation, must be given within 14 days. Any party
wishing not to mediate must waive, in writing, his or her right to
mediation. Any party filing an EEOC complaint or Title VII
suit will have, by filing, constructively waived their right to
mediate.
3. Neither this document nor an agreement to mediate waives any
substantive legal right or responsibility of any party. By choos-
ing to mediate, no party is at any time waiving his or her right to
file suit in court, go to arbitration, or file an EEOC complaint.
II. The Mediation Process
1. The mediation sessions will aim to reach an agreement about
the future conduct and relationship of the parties. The media-
tor's role is to facilitate agreement; the mediator is not a judge
or an arbitrator and does not "rule" on the merits of this case.
The power to resolve the dispute resides solely with the parties,
not the mediator. Before beginning the mediation session, all
parties must read the description of the mediation process
accompanying this policy, 4 5 and must acknowledge in writing
that they have read the description.
244. Several authorities were used as guidance in the drafting of this provision, in-
cluding: Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators §§ 1, 2, 4, 5 (American Arbitra-
tion Association et al., 1994); Containing Legal Costs, supra note 142, at 51; A
Drafter's Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution 72-73 (Bruce E. Meyerson & Co-
rinne Cooper, eds., 1991); Resolving Employment Disputes: A Manual on Drafting
Procedures, 2, 10 (American Arbitration Association, 1993); Howard J. Aibel &
George H. Friedman, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses in Complex Business
Transactions, Disp. Resol. J., Jan.-Mar. 1996, at 17; Levak, supra note 210, at 34-35;
Anthony J. Mercorella, Alternative Dispute Resolution-Expediting Cost Efficient
Resolution of Claims, in How to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution to Your Advan-
tage, supra note 188, at 17-19; David M. Shacter, To Litigate or Not?-Time for
A.D.R., 28 Beverly Hills B.J. 30, 33 (1994).
245. The description would define mediation, explain the logistics of the process,
and would largely mirror the discussion in supra part III.A.
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2. The mediator has complete control over the procedures used
during the sessions, including, but not limited to, the frequency
and duration of caucusing, the use of the initial joint session,
and the scheduling of the sessions.
3. The choice to participate in mediation is voluntary. Any party
may terminate the mediation at any time for any reason, by giv-
ing written notice of the termination to the mediator and to
each of the other parties to the mediation. Filing an EEOC
complaint or Title VII suit will be considered termination for
purposes of this policy.
4. The mediation sessions are confidential. Neither the mediator
nor any party to the mediation may disclose to anyone any in-
formation about or from the mediation process. Each party and
the mediator shall sign a confidentiality agreement prior to the
commencement of the first mediation session.
5. All parties shall attend the mediation sessions and make a good
faith effort to mediate.
6. At least one of the individuals present on behalf of each party
must have the authority to settle the dispute.
7. Each party to the mediation is both allowed and encouraged to
bring counsel to the mediation sessions. Counsel shall function,
however, as advisors rather than advocates.
8. The parties' remedies are not limited to cash settlements. The
exploration of other potential remedies is strongly encouraged.
III. Selection of a Mediator
1. The mediator must be:
(a) neutral and impartial;
(b) knowledgeable in the area of sexual harassment; and
(c) certified by an organization that requires:
(i) supervised training in the mediation process; and
(ii) adherence of the mediator to standards of conduct.2 4 6
2. The mediator shall immediately disclose any potential conflict
of interest to all parties.
3. An organization qualified to certify mediators as per 11.l1(c)
shall provide a list of three suggested mediators who meet the
qualifications in Section II1.1 above. If the parties agree on any
of the suggested mediators, that person wvill be the mediator.
Alternatively, any party to the mediation may suggest another
246. See, e.g., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, supra note 244. These
standards were drafted by representatives from the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, the American Bar Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Reso-
lution. Id. "The model standards of conduct for mediators are intended to perform
three major functions: to serve as a guide for the conduct of mediators; to inform the
mediating parties; and to promote public confidence in mediation as a process for
resolving disputes." Id at i.
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mediator who meets the qualifications in Section III.1., but all
the other parties must agree to that person being the mediator.
4. If the parties cannot agree on a mediator within 14 days after
mediation has been initiated, the organization supplying the
mediator will suggest one appropriate mediator. No party may
then object to the suggested mediator unless the mediator has a
conflict of interest.
5. The mediation shall commence within 21 days from the date on
which the mediator was chosen.
IV. Costs
1. The cost of the mediator will be split as follows: The employer
is responsible for 90% of the mediator's fees, and the complain-
ant employee is responsible for 10%. Inability of the employee
to pay the 10% will not, however, prevent a complainant em-
ployee from pursuing mediation. In such cases, the employer
shall pay the full amount and make arrangements with the com-
plainant employee for him or her to repay some amount, up to
the 10%, on a reasonable repayment schedule. The amount to
be paid and the repayment schedule shall be set by the Human
Resources Personnel Office, or similar office of the
employer.247
2. Further, the employer shall pay the cost of counsel for the com-
plainant employee, up to and including the cost of 25 billable
hours or $3000, whichever is less. The complainant employee
shall choose his or her counsel. This counsel, if he or she is to
be paid by the employer, must be present at the mediation.
V. Settlement
1. Any settlement reached by the parties must contain a liquidated
damages clause, providing a set amount that shall be paid
should a party breach the contractual agreement.
2. Once a settlement has been reached, the mediator or counsel
for one of the parties shall draft a written settlement document
incorporating the terms of the settlement.
3. If the mediator does not draft the settlement agreement, the
mediator shall review the agreement before it is given to the
parties for signature.
4. This draft shall be given to all parties, reviewed, changed if ap-
propriate, and executed.
247. The amount and schedule of payments should: (a) be set on a sliding scale,
where the amount and schedule of payments are based on the employee's income and
(b) apply on a company-wide basis to all mediations. The scale should be determined
in advance of any dispute.
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V. COMMENTARY ON THE PROPOSED MEDIATION PROVISION
The following part discusses each section of the proposed mediation
provision, offering explanation of how and why the sections are effec-
tive in mediating sexual harassment disputes. Understanding the pro-
vision is crucial so that employers can make any necessary
modifications to respond to the unique contours of sexual harassment
problems in their workplaces.
A. Proposal of Mediation (Sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3)
The first section of the contractual provision gives the right to medi-
ation to the parties involved in a sexual harassment dispute. Policies
that do not offer informal dispute resolution options like mediation
will likely discourage complaints. 4 The control over the dispute that
mediation offers encourages a high reporting rate for sexual
harassment 249
Some employers, such as large law firms, have complained they fear
that too many employees will lodge sexual harassment complaints if
the process is user-friendly, and may be reluctant to adopt a provision
such as the one suggested here.2s Employers who have actually im-
plemented such programs, however, have not experienced a flood of
complaints.5 In addition, a low reporting level caused by an inacces-
sible dispute resolution system simply belies the detrimental effects
that sexual harassment has on an employer's business.
Any party wishing to mediate can initiate the process by notifying
the parties in writing. The other parties have two weeks after receiv-
ing the notice within which to respond. The notice requirement en-
sures that no party can be forced to make an immediate decision
about whether to mediate. It gives parties time to evaluate the legal
and factual sufficiency of the allegations2 2 and decide on a dispute
resolution method.
Any party may waive its right to mediate if it does so in writing.
Filing an EEOC complaint or Title VII lawsuit will also be considered
a waiver of the party's mediation rights. The provision does not abso-
lutely require the parties to mediate because voluntary participation is
crucial to the mediation's success. 2S3 In addition, because the enforce-
248. See Rowe, supra note 3, at 171.
249. Id at 170. "[A]n employer must choose between a very high degree of com-
plainant choice, in dealing with concerns of harassment-and having a high reporting
rate-or, on the other hand, insisting on mandatory reporting to an Equal Opportu-
nity-type office and having a lower reporting rate." Id. at 171.
250. Richard B. Schmitt, More Law Firms Seek Arbitration for Internal Disputes,
Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1994, at B18.
251. Resolving Employment Disputes: A Manual on Drafting Procedures, supra
note 244, at 3.
252. The explication of the legal framework for quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment provided in parts L.A-C will aid in this determination.
253. See infra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
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ability of agreements in advance of arbitration has been the subject of
considerable litigation,2 4 a provision requiring mediation would be
similarly problematic. The proposed provision offers a compromise.
While not requiring mediation, it does require an affirmative act by
the parties to waive their mediation option. This will encourage some
reflection by the parties before relinquishing their mediation rights in
writing.
The provision also indicates that, by pursuing mediation, the parties
to the complaint of sexual harassment do not forfeit any other rights
or responsibilities. A complainant, for example, does not waive her
right to pursue a formal EEOC complaint by agreeing to attempt me-
diation under the company's internal policy. All parties must be
aware that an agreement to mediate will not preempt them from exer-
cising any of their remaining options for resolving the dispute, such as
arbitration or the filing of a formal Title VII suit. Although the high
success rate of mediation25 5 makes it unlikely that the parties' conflict
will ultimately require litigation or arbitration, this policy does not
foreclose that option.
B. Purpose of Mediation, Generally (Section 11.1)
It is imperative that the parties to a mediation understand both the
ultimate goal of mediation and the role of the parties in achieving that
goal. The contractual provision carefully differentiates between medi-
ation and arbitration or litigation, which serves both to educate the
parties and to focus the mediation session itself on the future rather
than the past.2 5 6 The policy allays the parties' fears about loss of con-
trol over the resolution of the dispute.257 Parties ultimately retain
control through the settlement they reach. The mediator has no au-
thority to force a settlement on the parties.25 8
Because some or all of the parties might be fundamentally unfamil-
iar with mediation, the policy also requires all parties to read a de-
scription of the mediation process itself.259 As mediation is quite
254. See Sedmak, supra note 151, at C-3.
255. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. This is not to discount the role that
discussion of past events will play in a mediation. The focus, however, should be on
the resolution of those events.
257. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, National Rules for Resolution of
Employment Disputes: Arbitration and Mediation Rules Rule 10, at 36 (1996) (here-
inafter National Rules) ("The mediator does not have the authority to impose a set-
tlement on the parties but will attempt to help them reach a satisfactory resolution of
their dispute.").
259. It is in the employer's best interest to provide the best possible information
about the mediation process to potential aggrieved employees, as this will likely in-
crease the number of employees willing to mediate their claims. The provision re-
quires that the employer provide the employee with, at a minimum, a written
description of mediation. This should not discourage employers from investing in
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different from litigation and arbitration, the employer must have a
statement prepared defining mediation to prepare parties for the pro-
cess. While the mediator may depart from the generally accepted ele-
ments of the mediation, 60 parties should be conversant with the basic
concepts.
C. Process and Timing of Mediation (Section 11.2)
While the parties have absolute power over the final agreement
arising out of the mediation, the mediator retains control over the
process of mediation itself. The mediator cannot force a particular
settlement on the parties,261 but for the mediation to be successful the
mediator must direct the procedural elements of the mediation as pro-
vided by the contractual provision. For example, under this policy, the
mediator may terminate a mediation session if the parties are at an
impasse- 62 The mediator, as a neutral party, is in the best position to
determine which procedures are most appropriate, fair, and likely to
result in an amicable resolution.
D. Voluntariness and Control (Section 11.3)
The contract reminds the parties that mediation is voluntary, and
provides for a method for withdrawing from the mediation. Compel-
ling participation undermines the benefits of a party's participation in
the mediation's outcome.6 3 Maintaining this balance of voluntariness
and control over the outcome is essential for the mediation process to
be most successful.
It is important to note, however, that "voluntary," for purposes of
the provision, does not mean strictly voluntary.
To say that there may be strong pressures to cooperate is not to say
that there is no voluntariness. We all make choices that are not
autonomous but that we are free to reject. It is in this sense that
mediation is voluntary; it relies both on coercive external pressures
and on an individual's decision to participate. 64
For the purposes of the contract, therefore, voluntary means "not
mandatory." The provision also allows for a mechanism permitting
parties to withdraw from the mediation. This gives meaning to the
voluntariness language by allowing withdrawal provided it is commu-
other educational media, including books or videos, that would provide employees
with further information.
260. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., National Rules, supra note 258, Rule 10, at 37. (-The mediator is
authorized to end the mediation whenever, in the judgment of the mediator, further
efforts at mediation would not contribute to a resolution of the dispute between the
parties.").
263. See Conti, supra note 168, at 298 & n.19.
264. Bethel & Singer, supra note 169, at 19.
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nicated to the other parties in writing. Filing an EEOC complaint or a
Title VII lawsuit will also be considered a termination for purposes of
the contract. Thus, the provision does not compel participation by an
uninterested party.
One limited instance where one of the parties may want to refuse its
right to mediate or withdraw from the mediation occurs when it be-
comes clear that the other side's case is completely without merit and
a motion in court could dispose of the complaint. 265 This is one of the
rare instances where litigation, because it would be so truncated,
might be more economically efficient than mediation.266 In these rare
instances, the policy allows the parties to terminate the mediation.
E. Confidentiality and Privacy (Section 114)
All parties to the mediation, including the mediator, are required to
sign a confidentiality agreement stipulating that the mediation ses-
sions are entirely confidential. The EEOC advises that any dispute
resolution method chosen for sexual harassment cases should en-
courage confidentiality.2 67 "There is general agreement that the suc-
cess of mediation is dependent upon an expectation of privacy and
confidentiality. ' 268 All parties to the mediation, including the em-
ployer, the complainant employee, and the alleged harasser, will have
privacy concerns surrounding the mediation. The employer, for in-
stance, will likely be worried about the negative publicity,2 69 while the
employees will be concerned about their reputations, both at the of-
fice and in the community at large.270 For this reason, mediation is an
especially appropriate forum when "there is some possibility that each
party may have engaged in less then ideal behavior."271
This confidentiality requirement not only protects the public repu-
tation of the parties, but also shields them from improper use of the
mediation discussions in a future litigation, if the case were to go to
trial.272 Often, the parties discuss incriminating or sensitive informa-
265. Mercorella, supra note 244, at 18.
266. If the case were truly meritless, there would be no reason to negotiate because
the party defending against a meritless position would, as expected, have no reason to
bargain.
267. Sex Discrimination, supra note 4, at D-29.
268. Folberg & Taylor, supra note 147, at 264.
269. Grover, supra note 120, at 55; Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 179, at 1142-43
(discussing the negative publicity for Baker & McKenzie flowing from the firm's loss
of a multi-million dollar sexual harassment case); supra note 89 and accompanying
text.
270. See supra notes 79 & 98 and accompanying text.
271. Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 179, at 1160.
272. Folberg & Taylor, supra note 147, at 271 ("A court would not necessarily be
bound to honor this private contract, though it may be persuaded by public policy
considerations to do so."). One court has gone so far in support of confidentiality,
however, as to imply an unwritten confidentiality provision into a mediation. See
NLRB v. Macaluso, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2097, 2099-100 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tion in the mediation sessions in the hopes of reaching a final agree-
ment. Without a confidentiality clause, the parties would be less likely
to offer potentially helpful information during the course of the medi-
ation because the other party could use it against them in subsequent
litigation or arbitration.273
F. Good Faith Efforts to Negotiate (Sections 11.5, 11.6)
Sections 11.5, 11.6, and 11.7 reinforce the role of the parties in the
mediation process. The dispute is unlikely to be resolved unless the
parties make a commitment to mediate in good faith.274 The pres-
ence of a representative capable of settling for each party at the medi-
ation is also required to ensure that the parties do not negotiate in
vain.2 75 For the employee parties, including the alleged harasser and
the victim of harassment, they will have the authority to settle these
claims. Section 11.6 ensures that the representative sent on behalf of
the employer has the requisite authority to settle the claim when the
parties arrive at a resolution. These stipulations help ensure that
there are no barriers to the mediation, either psychological or logisti-
cal, that would frustrate its purpose.
G. Function of Counsel (Section 11.7)
If the employee is represented by counsel, the power imbalances
inherent in a conflict between an employer and employee, such as
those present in a sexual harassment dispute, can begin to be re-
dressed.276 Further, employers will almost always have counsel pres-
ent at the mediation,7 7 and the presence of counsel for the employee
helps to bolster the employee's bargaining power and begins to bring
her into parity with the employer.27 8 The contractual provision en-
courages all parties to bring representation to the mediation.
An imbalance of power can also exist between the complainant em-
ployee and the accused harasser. This disparity may be based on a
combination of "personality, strategic position, tactical position, and
gender. ' 279 The harasser is unlikely to be disadvantaged during the
273. Costello, supra note 4, at 20.
274. "It is ... essential that all parties approach the mediation with open minds and
good faith. To begin with, the employee should be sincere in asserting the grievance."
Conti, supra note 168, at 297. This provision is also meant to protect against situa-
tions where one party is agreeing to mediate as a pretext for siphoning information
from the other party that could influence litigation strategies. Conduct like this would
violate the contract.
275. Shacter, supra note 244, at 33. "There is nothing more frustrating than spend-
ing several hours at the table helping the parties to embrace a more realistic view of
their case that will allow them to settle, only to find that the person with authority
either is not there or has to leave." Id.
276. Holzman, supra note 201, at 255.
277. Id.
278. Id
279. Irvine, supra note 23, at 37.
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mediation because the goal of both the harasser and the employer,
who is represented by counsel, is largely the same: to avoid liability
for the alleged harassment.28 ° The power imbalances of the employer
and harasser combine to create an especially disadvantageous situa-
tion for an unrepresented victim.
These potential disparities in power make counsel for the victim a
practical necessity?28' Victim's counsel can help the accused harasser
understand the harassment situation from the victim's point of
view.2a Counsel for the victim, as well as for the employer, however,
must act in an advisory, not adversarial capacity.28 3 An adversarial
approach to the mediation on behalf of counsel for one of the parties
can destroy the spirit of compromise that characterizes a successful
mediation. Attorneys should advise their client as to the viability of
the claim, and review any proposed settlements. 284 Although the at-
torneys will not be acting in their traditional, adversarial role, their
presence is important "[b]ecause an informed and educated client has
a much higher success rate in mediation. 285
Although it might be argued that presence of counsel cannot help
overcome these power imbalances sufficiently in a mediation session,
there is no evidence that litigation helps to better overcome the imbal-
ance of power.8 6 In fact, at least one scholar argues that, even with-
out counsel, there is no reason that a litigator can better "help" a
client transcend the power imbalance than a mediator.287 Representa-
tion of the victim by counsel will help even the playing field for all
parties so that they can reach a successful resolution.
H. Remedies (Section 11.8)
The policy invites the parties to consider non-monetary settlements,
or combinations of monetary and injunctive relief. Part of what
makes mediation an attractive alternative to litigation or arbitration is
the spectrum of settlements open for consideration, 288 and this provi-
sion directs parties to avail themselves of this benefit.
280. See Ross, supra note 128, at 1454.
281. See Gadlin, supra note 81, at 149-50.
282. Id. at 149.
283. Elaine A. Wohlner & John A. Rymers, Civil Mediation: Where, When and
Why It Is Effective, 24 Colo. Law. 2161, 2162 (1995). "The mediation process is suc-
cessful only when controlled by the parties and not by the mediator or legal counsel."
Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Gadlin, supra note 81, at 151.
287. Rifkdn, supra note 208, at 30. In addition, a survey of women in past sexual
harassment mediations indicates that many women have felt that the mediation pro-
cess itself altered the power aspects of the controversy in their favor. Deborah G.
Goolsby, Note, Using Mediation in Cases of Simple Rape, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1183, 1212 (1990).
288. See supra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
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I. Selection of a Mediator (Section III)
The choice of the mediator is of paramount importance in the medi-
ation, often serving as the decisive factor to the mediation's success.M
As such, the contractual provision devotes significant attention to the
selection of the mediator. The contract requires first that the media-
tor be "neutral and impartial." While all mediators will bring internal
biases to the mediation,290 an effective mediator works toward impar-
tiality, avoiding any conduct indicative of partiality. 91 A good media-
tor is inclusive, and can communicate with a wide variety of
individuals regardless of their gender, economic status, race, or other
characteristics.292 Overcoming internal biases to build the trust of the
parties in a sexual harassment dispute can be a serious challenge for
the mediator, as "mediators must seek to build trust-and more
trust-in an environment customarily viewed as male-dominated and
formalistic. 2 93 As such, it is often a good idea to select a mediator
with significant experience dealing with situations involving an abuse
of power, which is a key element of a sexual harassment dispute.
Overall, the goal of the mediator is to level the playing field so that
even the un-represented or under-represented claimant can partici-
pate in the mediation and reach a fair agreement.29
It is also important that the mediator be familiar with the substan-
tive law in the area of sexual harassment. Ultimately, mediators
"ought to value intrinsic merits above advocacy skills."2 95 The media-
tor may be able to facilitate an agreement by conveying potential bad
news about the possibilities of success in court to one or both parties.
Some working knowledge of sexual harassment law will be necessary
for the mediator to make such a judgment call.296 In this way, too, the
parties can get something from mediation that they cannot get from a
jury trial: a mediator/expert, who is more qualified to evaluate the
legal sufficiency of a harassment claim than is a lay jury.2 97
289. Shacter, supra note 244, at 31.
290. Rifkin, supra note 208, at 26. "[T]he mediator inevitably brings to the process,
deliberately or not, certain ideas, knowledge, and assumptions." Id.
291. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, supra note 244, § II crnt. 1 ("A
mediator shall avoid conduct that gives the appearance of partiality toward one of the
parties. The quality of the mediation process is enhanced when the parties have confi-
dence in the impartiality of the mediator.").
292. Sam Leonard, Mediation: The Book: A Step-by-Step Guide for Dispute Re-
solvers 84 (1994).
293. Winograd, supra note 114, at 40.
294. Tia S. Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace Dispute
Resolver, Disp. Resol. J., June 1994, at 48, 50.
295. Id.
296. The earlier the parties can determine the merits of their respective cases, the
more likely a settlement will be reached, and "this process is accelerated through the
use of a mediator." Aswad, supra note 5, at A-9.
297. Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 179, at 1143-44.
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The third mediator qualification requires certification by some
ADR organization. This certification is necessary to ensure that an
organized body is reviewing the conduct of the chosen mediator. Fur-
thermore, the organization will provide that the mediator is formally
trained. 98 Such an organization must require that the mediator agree
to abide by a code of ethics, such as the Model Standards of Conduct
for Mediators. 99
The contract requires the ADR organization who certifies the
mediators to make a list of appropriate mediators available for review
by the parties. If the parties can agree on one of the mediators on this
list, that person will mediate the dispute. Otherwise, any party can
then make alternative suggestions, provided the proposed mediator
meets the qualifications in the provisions. The other parties must then
agree on the suggested mediator. Because one of the principal bene-
fits of mediation is its ability to save time, the parties have fourteen
days to agree on the mediator. After that time, the organization from
which they are drawing the mediator will suggest an appropriate can-
didate, and the parties can only strike the suggestion for bias.
Absent from the suggested contractual provision is a designation of
the mediator's gender. Similarly, the American Arbitration Associa-
tion does not require the mediator of a sexual harassment dispute to
be of a particular gender.300 Although there have been arguments
made against allowing men to mediate sexual harassment cases, 30 1 this
position is largely based on a gender stereotype, namely that men are
incapable of understanding what a "reasonable woman" would find
offensive in the workplace.3 °2 Any mediator must maintain gender
neutrality30 3 in much the same way he might be required to maintain
racial neutrality in a mediation regarding racial discrimination. Just as
a male judge can be an appropriate adjudicator in sexual harassment
litigation, a man can be an effective mediator in such a case.
298. Wohlner & Rymers, supra note 283, at 2164 n.16.
299. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, supra note 244.
300. A Model Sexual Harassment Claim Resolution Process § V(B) (American Ar-
bitration Association 1994) (providing that the mediator may be of either gender).
301. For example:
In some instances, male mediators may find themselves at a loss for words, if
not understanding, in dealing with the passions that have brought the dispu-
tants into conflict. In other instances, men may wonder if they, too, have
offended others, perhaps unintentionally, thereby jeopardizing or question-
ing their own neutrality.
Winograd, supra note 114, at 40.
302. Indeed, one might well argue that if gender standards like the "reasonable
woman" standard run the risk of entrenching negative gender stereotypes, see supra
note 35 and accompanying text, so too does a refusal to allow men to mediate sexual
harassment cases. In addition, it is curious that special criticism is reserved for male
mediators, who cannot force a settlement on the parties, but critics make no mention
of male arbitrators or judges, whose rulings-presumably also reflecting their internal
biases-are final and binding.
303. Winograd, supra note 114, at 41.
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In response to the argument against men mediating sexual harass-
ment cases, some scholars have suggested the use of a two-person, bi-
gender mediation team.3" This co-mediation solution, however, also
has its drawbacks. Most importantly, the presence of two mediators
can alter the dynamics of the mediation sessions.3"5 If the mediators
are unaccustomed to working together, the division of labor may be
unclear to both the mediators and the parties.30 6 Further, both the
harasser and the employee, usually being of different sexes, might feel
prejudiced by a mediator of the opposite sex when two mediators are
present.307 If accurate, this suggests that each party in a mediation
presided over by a bi-gender panel would somehow feel a connection
with the mediator of their gender. Rather than focusing on reaching
agreement with the other party, the parties might focus their energy
on convincing the "partial," same-sex audience of the merits in their
position. This would create an awkward triangulation where each
party seeks to "win" one mediator. Further, co-mediation has the ad-
ded shortcoming of doubling the cost of the mediation session, when
reduced expense is one of the reasons mediation is so desirable as a
dispute resolver. For these reasons, the gender of the mediator is un-
specified by the provisions.
J. Costs (Sections 1V.1, IV.2)
The contractual provisions attempt to balance the economic con-
cerns of the employer and employee. They require that the employer
and employee divide the cost of mediation.308 Otherwise, if the em-
ployer pays the entire cost, it seems the mediation is "owned" by the
employer.30 9 On the other hand, if the mediation option was free, no
victim could claim that money kept her from pursuing the mediation
course to resolve her dispute. As such, the provision provides for a
payment plan if the victim is unable to pay the 10% up front. If both
304. Id; Grover, supra note 120, at 55; Levak, supra note 210, at 35.
305. Folberg & Taylor, supra note 147, at 144-46.
306. This lack of control on behalf of the mediators is problematic.
Politeness or deference may create a hesitancy to intercede or to cover a
point that appears to be in the other mediator's territory. Important points
may slip through the mediation team like a tennis ball landing between new
doubles partners. One mediator may fail to read the other's clues. The
other, failing to see where the discussion is heading, may interrupt or divert
the mediation.
Id. at 145.
307. Levak, supra note 210, at 34. Indeed, the requirement of a bi-gender panel
implies that a single mediator of either gender would be incapable of mediating sexual
harassment cases. If the parties did not feel a prejudice prior to the mediation, the
very fact that both genders must be represented on the mediation panel might well
give parties needless cause for alarm.
308. See Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Dispute Resolution, 91 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) E-12 (May 11, 1995) ("Impartiality is best assured by the parties sharing the
fees and expenses of the mediator and arbitrator.").
309. Denenberg & Denenberg, supra note 294, at 50.
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parties contribute something to the mediation process, both feel as if
they have invested something in it, thus increasing its likelihood of
success. 310 In the end, the most each party has risked is the cost of the
mediation session and some nominal attorney's fees.311
The second provision in Section IV requires that the employer pro-
vide the employee with counsel. In a litigation, the employer would
be responsible for the attorney's fees of a successful claimant em-
ployee.312 Because the presence of counsel for the victim goes so far
in compensating for the inherent power imbalances in a sexual harass-
ment dispute313 and facilitates a better agreement, it is in the em-
ployer's best interest to provide counsel to its employees. The
contract allows the employee to choose the counsel, allowing her fur-
ther latitude in sculpting the mediation process. Although this does
require a further cost to the employer, the cost is greatly outweighed
by the eventual savings that can result from a successful mediation.
K. Settlement (Sections V.1, V.2, V.3, V.4)
The contract requires that any settlement agreement upon which
the parties agree must contain a liquidated damages clause. The aim
in mediating the sexual harassment dispute is to avoid unnecessary
litigation. Thus, agreeing on a liquidated damages amount reduces
the possibility that the parties will enter into litigation regarding the
settlement agreement itself. Settlement agreements should also expli-
cate the remedies as specifically as possible, so that there is no confu-
sion over the responsibilities of each party under the contract.
Once the parties have reached an agreement, either the mediator or
one of the parties will be designated to memorialize the agreement. If
a party other than the mediator drafts the agreement, the mediator
must review the draft to ensure that it comports with what the parties
agreed upon during the mediation. A written draft should be circu-
lated to all the parties, reviewed, changed if necessary, and executed.
The provision provides that the draft can be amended if, for whatever
reason, the draft does not accurately reflect the settlement agreed
upon during the mediation. The executed settlement agreement is
binding on all parties.
CONCLUSION
When sexual harassment pervades a workplace, no one wins; the
employer loses money in employee hours and may be exposed to legal
liability, and the victim suffers the harassment and often a long, ex-
310. Grover, supra note 120, at 55-56.
311. See Miller, supra note 235, at 163.
312. Under Title VII § 706(k), a successful sexual harassment plaintiff can recover
her attorney's fees. See generally Holzman, supra note 201, at 246 (exploring informal
dispute resolution and subsequent recovery of attorney's fees under Title VII).
313. See supra part V.G.
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pensive battle to obtain a remedy. Employers should integrate media-
tion, a partial solution to the sexual harassment problem, into their
sexual harassment policies. The best time for employers to form such
a policy, including a reconsideration of their workplace dispute resolu-
tion methods, is before complaints are filed.
After an incident of harassment occurs, mediation provides maxi-
mum benefits to the parties involved. All parties save time, money,
and damage to their reputations. The employer is able to meet its
legal obligations by providing a dispute resolution system for employ-
ees. Mediation allows the alleged harasser access to one of the few
forums where he has the opportunity to respond directly to the allega-
tions, and perhaps offer an apology. Mediation empowers the victim,
with remedies available that litigation could never hope to provide.
In the end, the parties risk very little by choosing to mediate, and
gain a quick and relatively amicable resolution to their conflict. This
peaceful resolution is essential for sexual harassment claims where
some, if not all, of the parties to the complaint will want to continue
their relationship after the conflict is resolved. Mediation allows the
parties to jointly fashion a remedy responsive to the unique contours
of their dispute, vesting ultimate control in the parties, without bar-
ring them from pursuing other alternatives if the mediation is not suc-
cessful. While mediation is not a panacea, it is the most promising and
effective alternative to litigation for resolving sexual harassment
disputes.
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